Showing posts with label globalization. Show all posts
Showing posts with label globalization. Show all posts

Monday, May 1, 2017

Dagan on International Tax and Global Justice

Tsilly Dagan recently posted this new paper on the limitations of normative tax analysis that constrains itself to the state. Here is the abstract:
Inequality, as well as the scope of the duty of justice to reduce it, has always been a central concern of political justice. Income taxation has been seen as a key tool for redistribution and the state was the arena for discussions of justice. Globalization and the tax competition it fosters among states change the context for the discussion of distributive justice. Given the state’s fading coercive power in taxation and the decreasing power of its citizenry to co-author its collective will due to global competition, we can no longer assume that justice can be realized within the parameters of the state. 
International tax policy in an effort to retain justice often opts for cooperation as a vehicle to support distributive justice. But cooperation among states is more than a way for them to promote their aims through bargaining. Rather, it is a way for states to regain legitimacy by sustaining their very ability to ensure the collective action of their citizens and to treat them with equal respect and concern. The traditional discussion in international taxation seems to endorse a statist position — implicitly assuming that when states bargain for a multilateral deal, justice is completely mediated by the agreement of the states. 
In contrast, this Article argues that such a multilateral regime intended to provide the state with fundamental legitimacy requires independent justification. Contrary to the conventional statist position, I maintain that cooperating states have a duty to ensure that the constituents of all cooperating states are not treated unjustly because of the agreement. I argue that not only cosmopolitanism but political justice too requires that a justiciable cooperative regime must improve (or at least not worsen) the welfare of the least well-off citizens in all cooperating states. I explain that cooperation alone is no guarantee of improved welfare and that certain transfer payments between rich and poor countries might be required to ensure this.
 This is an important and provocative paper, highly recommended reading.

Monday, May 16, 2016

Tax Coop 2016: "Winning the Tax Wars" May 23-24

Tax Coop and the World Bank are hosting a conference on tax competition and cooperation to be held in Washington DC on May 23-24. As last year, I've constructed the debate, which this year will be livestreamed on May 23 at 16:15 EST.  I'll post the link when I have that information. At last year's conference, Dan Mitchell (Cato) and Richard Murphy (TJN) put corporate taxation on trial, debating the continuing viability of this tax in the face of technological innovation and economic globalization. This year's debaters are Alison Holder of ActionAid and Veronique de Rugy of the Mercatus Center at George Mason University.

They will debate the following:


This question will be explored through a series of three resolutions, as follows:
  1. First, be it resolved that: tax competition harms developing countries by reducing their capability to raise fiscal revenue to finance physical and social infrastructure needed for economic growth and social inclusion.
  2. Second, be it resolved that: tax competition increases developing countries’ reliance on foreign aid, making them more vulnerable to aid volatility. 
  3. Third, be it resolved that: tax competition aggravates existing income disparities between developed and developing countries.
Arguing the “affirming side” of each resolution will be Alison Holder of ActionAid. Arguing the “opposing side” of each resolution will be Veronique de Rugy of the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. Evidence from all jurisdictions will be admissible. The emphasis will be on persuasive, clear, and logical argumentation. The debate will proceed in four rounds and will be moderated and judged by Louise Otis of McGill University and Jay Rosengard of Harvard University. Last year's debate was definitely a highlight of the conference and I look forward to hosting Ms. Holder and Ms. DeRugy for this year's event. 

The full conference program features a slate of distinguished speakers from around the world and across public, private, and academic sectors.  Registration is free; additional program and speaker information available here and you can follow @taxCoop on twitter for updates and links. 







Thursday, March 17, 2016

Soft Tax Law & Multilateralism: Modifying treaties with anti-BEPS measures

As observers of global tax policy know, international tax issues are dealt with in bilateral treaties that more or less adhere to a 'model' tax treaty developed and periodically updated by the OECD (provisions in a rival UN Model are occasionally invoked, and the US has its own model with its own distinctions and idiosyncrasies). There are those who have long lamented the problem of having thousands of bilateral agreements that can't be easily or quickly updated when the OECD revises the model (thus curbing the impact of OECD soft law).

As part of the base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) initiative, the OECD is currently developing a
"Multilateral instrument on tax treaty measures to tackle BEPS" which would be used to 'modify' all existing tax treaties in force among signatory countries. The OECD says this mechanism (which it calls an 'innovative approach') 'would preserve the bilateral nature of tax treaties' even as it modified all existing bilateral treaties 'in a synchronized way'. The OECD says there are "limited precedents" for modifying bilateral treaties with a multilateral instrument.

But are there really any precedents at all? I couldn't think of any off-hand. A quick check with a few international law colleagues yielded few comparators. Tim Meyer suggested the EU harmonizing efforts on Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) as a candidate, albeit noting that this does not contemplate directly overriding existing BITs but requires EU members to change their bilateral arrangements to conform with EU investment policy.

Tim also made the interesting observation that"treaties that reference customary international law standards, such as BITs’ reference to the minimum standard of treatment" could be overridden in a somewhat similar fashion. He explained that "[i]f custom changed, such as through the promulgation of soft law documents or multilateral treaties, it would change the BITs that incorporate the customary standard. That isn’t exactly the same thing [as the new OECD multilateral instrument], but similar."

The OECD's work in developing "global consensus" has in the past led some to describe OECD standards as "soft law" and others to suggest that the OECD may be understood to articulate customary international tax law; moreover the OECD has itself now taken to describing its model as soft law (including in its 2014 report on the multilateral instrument). I have urged caution in defining OECD proclamations as soft law or customary law given the OECD's exclusive membership of mainly rich countries, which excludes all of the BRICs and most of the rest of the world, as I think the nomenclature lends an imprimatur of legitimacy to OECD proclamations that may not be deserved. But it seems clear that the BEPS action items, and the new global forum to "monitor compliance" with them, are intended to overcome the exclusivity problem while endowing OECD norms with ever-greater law-like effect (without offending the unicorn that is "tax sovereignty").

It seems likely to me that a multilateral agreement that modifies existing tax treaties is actually intended to ultimately replace those treaties, making small and incremental modifications until the underlying bilateral treaties become superfluous or extinct. Accordingly I view the OECD's multilateral 'modification' function to be an exercise in creeping harmonization as well as "ossification" (or maybe transformation) of soft law into hard law.

Adding together the other elements of BEPS, including the new global forum to compel national compliance with 'minimum standards' as they develop, I recently suggested that the OECD's tax folks are giving birth to a new global tax order complete with rules, audits, and reform processes. This is perhaps not the order envisioned by those who have in the past called for global tax coordination in a supranational body for the sake of pursuing global tax justice. If the OECD-based regime is not fully supranational yet, it is close, and it looks increasingly inevitable once it sets a multilateral agreement in place.

There are many fascinating threads of soft law and public international law are at work in these developments. I recently came across an article by Jung-Hong Kim on the topic, entitled A New Age of Multilateralism in International Taxation?, abstract:
 With the OECD/G20 BEPS project, the current international tax landscape is facing challenges and changes unprecedented for the past several decades. This paper looks at the development of bilateralism and multilateralism in the current international tax regime, takes stock of the BEPS works and analyzes the proposed Multilateral Instrument. Then, the paper discusses the emerging multilateral tax order in international taxation. 
Historically, bilateralism has been the constant trend of tax treaties, and later multilateral tax treaties have emerged in some regional areas. There being some deficiencies with bilateral treaties such as dilapidation, delay in entry into force and vulnerability to treaty shopping, the experience of multilateral tax treaties can help build a foundation for future development of a multilateral tax treaty to complement the bilateral tax treaty network. 
With a caveat that BEPS output is fluid at this stage, drawing on the various examples of existing non-tax multilateral treaties, the Multilateral Instrument will be a desirable and feasible tool to reflect the necessary changes resulting from BEPS project. For Korea whose tax treaties need a systematic upgrade after a noticeable growth in quantity, the negotiation on the Multilateral Instrument of the BEPS project will be a great opportunity to revisit the existing bilateral tax treaties and to make appropriate amendments with bilateral treaty partners in multilateral format. 
Beyond BEPS, supposing that the work on the Multilateral Instrument results in a multilateral convention, the inevitable question is the emergence of a multilateral tax order. In terms of feasibility of such a multilateral tax order, there are both positive and negative sides. The positive side is that the relative success of Global Forum on Tax Transparency can be a guidance on the post-BEPS multilateral tax order. On the other hand, the phenomenon of diminishing multilateral trade regime and bilateral investment treaty regime seem to be a negative evidence. Another point to consider is the appropriate forum to manage the multilateral tax order. For this, there are two competing organizations, i.e., the OECD CFA and UN tax committee, each of which having some limit to be developed into an intergovernmental forum. 
After all, the essential question will be how those major players such as the U.S., EU, China, India etc. could build a consensus by compromising on the institutional and substantive aspects of the multilateral tax order. For now, for the emerging multilateral tax order to proceed on a sound basis, the work of the BEPS project should bear substantive and meaningful fruits. 
This is a useful contribution to the discussion and I would like to see more analysis on the OECD's developments, especially from the perspective of nonOECD countries that are being drawn in as BEPS Associates. I would be interested to hear from readers with thoughts on the public international law foundations and precedents, particularly any comparator regimes that I should be thinking about.

Wednesday, October 29, 2014

Litigation over new US citizenship renunciation fee

The grassroots group that is challenging the validity of Canada's implementation of FATCA with respect to Canadian citizens and residents has released a letter to the U.S. State Department regarding the recent decision to increase the fee for renouncing U.S. citizenship--which is now $2,350. In 2009 the fee was zero. It was introduced in February 2010 (just before FATCA was enacted) and went into effect 6 months later, following Administrative Procedure Act requirements.

You can read the full letter here. In brief, the right to leave a country is not only a universally accepted human right, it is also enshrined in U.S. law. The letter challenges the fee in substance as an unlawful infringement of that right, and in process as a violation of the APA, as the State Department did not observe the procedural requirements for increasing the fee 500% even though it had done so in initially introducing it. Presumably, the group will commence litigation to enjoin the State Department from both legal violations.

Wednesday, October 8, 2014

Reforming Entity Taxation

Boston College is hosting a conference on Reforming Entity Taxation this Friday; I'll be on the international panel where I'll be giving a paper I've entitled "Who's Got the Power: Dividing the Global Income Tax Base." My theme: reforming entity taxation is purely about the political will of powerful states, perhaps especially the US. It is often repeated that with great power comes great responsibility. I argue that powerful nations have fallen far short on living up to the latter. I take a look back at how the League of Nations started the inquiry into how nations ought to share the global income tax base but ended up answering the question with power instead of principles, and how today's mix of FATCA, BEPS and the Baucus plan demonstrates that we are still doing the same thing today. I'll post a draft soon. Here is the lineup for Friday:

Keynote Speaker: Lee Sheppard (Contributing Editor, Tax Analysts)                            

Reforming Entity Taxation: Corporations

Mirit Eyal-Cohen (Alabama)
Deborah Schenk (NYU)
Dan Shaviro (NYU)
Brian Galle (Boston College) Commentator
Jeremy Scott (Editor in Chief of News, Tax Analysts) Moderator

Reforming Entity Taxation: Partnerships

Karen Burke (Florida)
Andrea Monroe (Temple)
Gregg Polsky (North Carolina)
James Repetti (Boston College) Commentator
Amy Elliott (Contributing Editor, Tax Notes) Moderator

Reforming Entity Taxation: International

Allison Christians (McGill)
Robert Peroni (Texas)
Martin Sullivan (Tax Analysts)
Diane Ring (Boston College) Commentator
Sam Young (Editor Worldwide Tax Daily) Moderator

Destination: Silicon Valley North

I took part in the latest McGill Law Journal Podcast, this time to talk about tax incentives and innovation. Have a listen.

Wednesday, August 6, 2014

Christians on Regulating Tax Preparers: A Global Problem for the IRS

I have a new column this week in Tax Analysts: Regulating Tax Preparers: A Global Problem for the IRS, in which I discuss the challenges of protecting a global taxpayer population from fraud and abuse and make (yet another) plea for sanity in the form of abandoning citizenship taxation and turning to residence-base taxation. Here is the gated published version; here is the SSRN version (ungated). And here is a brief abstract:


The IRS recently announced that its mandatory registration regime for paid tax return preparers, struck down in the Loving decision, would henceforth be offered as a voluntary program. But the authors of this program appear to have forgotten that the US system is perfectly global in reach, thanks to its permanent inclusion of citizens and others with legal residence status no matter where in the world they live. Protecting a global taxpayer population from fraud and abuse is an enormous task, with massive legal, administrative, and even diplomatic factors to consider. Citizenship taxation plagues the project of tax return preparer regulation, just as it does all aspects of US tax law. Accepting the universally practiced norm of residency-based taxation is the only viable solution. If Congress cannot do so, it will always be the case that for the IRS, thinking locally truly means acting globally.
Just as this was published, a friend sent me an email about a growing problem of FBAR fraud, in which criminals attempt to get personal & financial information from people by sending them serious looking notices. Here's an example, from Tax-Expatriation blog:


I'm sorry I didn't see this before I published my column, as I would have mentioned it as a significant issue. Capitalizing on the ignorance and fear of regular (non-rich) US persons outside the United States will be all too easy for criminals, I am afraid. I hope that the IRS and FinCEN can figure out a way to warn people--but I don't see how they can really do that on a global scale, especially since FATCA's job is to funnel information about millions of people to the IRS, and not the other way around. At minimum, every government that signs an agreement to implement FATCA should be sending out the warnings, since each is undertaking a huge responsibility in implementing US citizenship taxation on their own residents.


Monday, July 28, 2014

Sheppard on International Tax: What's Gonna Work? Teamwork.

Lee Sheppard has a nice column today on dual consolidated loss rules and BEPS (gated), in which she states:
Would-be reformers of the corporate income tax like to believe in the tax equivalent of a single game-changing player. They want an instant, simple solution -- be it a territorial system or formulary apportionment. They don't want to have to think about the grunt work of making an international system work. They don't want to have to think about the heavy lifting of rewriting the source rules. They don't want to think about detailed anti-hybrid rules. 
Of course she uses Argentina v Germany rather than the Wonder Pets, but same idea.

She goes on to explain the multiple problems posed by hybrid entities and how the BEPS hybrid draft has, and has not, addressed these. Sheppard's article demonstrates yet again that making income taxation work today means regulatory globalization that parallels the scale and scope of economic globalization.

The magnitude of the task is vividly demonstrated in FATCA: a concise statute that has rapidly expanded into thousands of pages of regulations, guidance, and agency explanations, a bilateral agreement network that dwarfs the US tax treaty network, and the spawning of a global compliance industry trucking in data collection, transfer, and analysis in both the private and public sectors. BEPS would be no different. it would require the same type of global infrastructure and the same level of sustained commitment. But it is clear that while the US has a great appetite for making FATCA work, and has directed all of its economic might to that effort, it is much, much less interested in seeing BEPS through. The ultimate outcome of BEPS is all too predictable from past OECD efforts that were not initiated by the US.

Sunday, June 8, 2014

The World According to FATCA, In 3 Maps

As of 8 June 2014, this is the world according to FATCA:

Countries that have actually signed an intergovernmental agreement.

Countries treated as having signed an intergovernmental agreement.

Countries with no agreement, actual or implied; FATCA applies unilaterally.

There really isn't any doubt that some of the poorest countries in the world will be most unfairly treated in any multilateral regime for global information exchange which excludes the United States because it acts unilaterally to attain solely its own goals, with no regard for the price others must pay or the appropriateness of imposing that cost where no wrong has ever been accused much less proven.

Prof. Karen Brown wrote an important and influential article in 2002 called Missing Africa on the topic of US tax and trade policy toward developing countries in general, Sub-Saharan Africa in particular. Her article starts with a quote: "We're the... United States. Do we need Africa?"' (from a former World Health Organization official who resigned over the lack of commitment to control AIDS in Africa).

Here the pattern repeats itself: even if they wanted to, many of the countries in the third map cannot forestall the present threat of economic sanctions. The United States simply doesn't need them. Yet many, many of these countries suffer far more from bank secrecy provided by the US and elsewhere than the other way around.

The unjustified and virtually-ignored perfection of US citizenship taxation is one part of FATCA's unexamined legacy, the dismantling of comity in international taxation another; so, too, the repeated exclusion of the developing world from an institutional order that is becoming increasingly unjust.

Wednesday, April 23, 2014

European Commission Seeks Input on Tax Issues of Cross-Border Citizens

The European Commission is seeking consultation through 3 June 2014 on the problems faced by "cross-border citizens."  They desire input from "[a]ll stakeholders – citizens, EU countries, tax administrations, governmental and business organisations, tax practitioners and academics." Some background:
Individuals exercising cross-border activities within the EU are often confronted with different/ additional tax issues compared to individuals who are active only within a single EU country. The issues that can arise may include complex administrative procedures in one or both countries involved that make tax compliance difficult; language barriers; different interpretations of tax treaties by the EU countries involved; difficulties in accessing relevant tax information; and difficulties in identifying officials responsible in national tax administrations. The problems often stem from the fact that two or more EU countries may have the right to tax the income in a cross-border case. Even if procedures exist in theory to prevent double or multiple taxation, the application of those procedures may be very complicated in practice. 
Some EU countries have adopted measures to address these cross-border tax problems. ... 
Although these measures are good, more may need to be done and other countries may still need to take steps in this direction. 
The Commission services are launching this public consultation with a view to inviting all interested parties to contribute to the exercise of providing information on current problems and identifying good practices applied by some EU tax administrations that go some way towards addressing these problems. This will allow the Commission to come up with solutions such as to recommend that all EU countries adopt certain good practices.
You can find links for various types of submissions at the link above.

My favorite part: "Received contributions will be published on the Internet." Yes! Very frustrating when a public consultation ends in the deafening silence of black box decsion-making based on undisclosed inputs. By making this truly public, the EC is providing a data source for researchers that could lead to more creative thinking in the long run. Lessons about the impact of tax issues on intra-European activity from this consultation might help inform our thinking about the taxation of cross border citizens more generally.

Sunday, April 13, 2014

From the NYT: Lessons for International Tax from Oregon's Role as Sales/Use Tax Haven

Today's NYT has an article entitled "Buyers Find Tax Break on Art: Let it Hang Awhile in Oregon." The artful dodge is accomplished via simple arbitrage between a source, an intermediary, and a residence jurisdiction, so the story gives a nice illustration of a phenomenon we see play out on the international stage every day, only we have generally been taught to associate tax avoidance arbitrage with the likes of GE, Google, Apple, etc. Here is the simple pattern:
  1. The collector lives in state A (the residence state)--in this example, California. 
  2. The collector buys an expensive work of art in state B (the source state), in this case, New York. As the source state, state B could extract a tax purely on the occurrence of the sale, but chooses not to, rather basing its sales tax on place of use. 
  3. State A generally imposes use taxes on items purchased from outside the state and brought into the state (this is to treat external sales the same as internal ones, which would be subject to sales taxes). But there is an exception: if an item is "used" in another state first, it is not subject to the use tax when it finally makes its way to state A.
  4. To avoid the use tax, the collector can't keep the item in state B because then state B's sales tax will apply.
  5. In comes state C, with no sales or use tax, in this case, Oregon. State C is a safe haven. Collector parks the asset in state C long enough to satisfy the residence state's exemption. 
  6. Hey presto, neither sales nor use tax. 
Nothing illegal has occurred, as the NYT is very quick to point out. But it is also clear that this is a story for a reason, and the reason suggested by the headline is this outcome produces unfairness. 

After all, these are rich people dodging around helpless tax states with the help of sophisticated tax planners. This seems worth examining further given the parallels to corporate social responsibility and international tax planning à la Caterpillar as we have seen recently in the news, and in light of the actions of some states to try to curb international tax planning ... and please do not let it escape notice that this list includes Oregon. 

Let's identify a few problems and a few solutions in the overall tax regime created by the conflicting rules in the three independent states as suggested above. The problems seem to be:
  1. residents of state A will likely object that it is not fair for state A to tax sales occurring in the state and not sales occurring outside the state (violates horizontal equity).
  2. some residents of state A will likely object that it is not smart to tax sales occurring in the state and not sales occurring outside the state (people will react accordingly and the sales tax base will disappear). 
  3. on the other hand, some residents of state A will argue it is smart to do this because it means more people will buy nice things and ultimately bring them into the state C, causing other spillover benefits in the long run. (If so we should question why state A has a use tax at all.)
  4. state A cannot control either state B or state C but unless strict capital or other regulatory controls are applied against state A's population, state A's rules necessarily interact with B and C.
  5. residents of state B might object that it is not fair for state B to tax sales only if the assets purchased stay in the state and not if they leave the state (violates horizontal equity)
  6. on the other hand residents of state B will likely view it as smart for state B to tax sales only if the assets purchased stay in the state and not if they leave the state, because then more sales will occur in state B and with those sales come jobs and other spillover benefits.
  7. state C just doesn't tax these things and so would seem to be neutral, acting without fault in the arbitrage.
  8. state C residents likely view this neutrality as smart because the state benefits by facilitating the arbitrage between states A and B, and it can be expected to defend this benefit.
  9. but what is smart for either states B or C or both creates an unqualifiedly unfair situation in state A.
So much for the problems. Are there solutions?  Again the illustration is enlightening.
  1. A, B, and C could get together and demand a federal regulation to stop the arbitrage amongst the states. They could, but they won't (cooperation fails).
  2. State A could threaten states B and C to stop facilitating the arbitrage or else (coercion). But what, exactly, does state A want? Does it want to force state B to tax on the basis of source? Does it want state C to tax as the conduit? Either of those would produce fairness in that the individuals would pay tax somewhere, but in neither case would it be state A collecting the tax. Also, depending on state C's political, economic, and social power relative to state A, the strategy could yield results, or not; certainly if harsh tactics are used, state A will be resented by its neighbors, and for what? No revenue, but a globally fairer system that neither B nor C wanted.
  3. State A could change its own law to repeal the first use rule, which would eliminate the benefit of the arbitrage. No more icing on the cake per the collector routing through Oregon. (when people say tax planning is icing on the cake as the person did in this article, I picture a tiny cake with a tower of icing. So much icing that by the time you eat it all, there isn't any room for cake. But I digress.)
Now does it not seem that state A has the most power to fix the situation if it chooses to change its own law to nullify the arbitrage? Is this not what Oregon and other states are doing vis à vis the foreign earnings of state-registered companies?

This is what I am talking about when I say that tax avoidance is as much a supply side as a demand side problem. We can blame states B and C all day long for facilitating tax avoidance. But State A often holds the power to solve the problem itself. If state A does not do that, then we should be looking at why state A does not do that rather than why state B or state C stand by and allow or encourage and benefit from the arbitrage. Are democratic decisions being made to ignore the fairness problem in order to achieve a solution some people in state A consider to be smart, and if they are doing so, who are those people who think this is smart and have the people in state A who do not think it is so smart been allowed access to lawmaking in the same manner and capacity of those who do think it is smart?

Note that in this case there is no discussion about the problem of information asymmetry--that is, we are not looking at state B or C hiding the fact of the sale from state A. That is a different problem which state A might not be able to solve on its own (actually I believe it could but that is another story). But in terms of legal tax avoidance, I think this story is a wonderful illustration of the argument I often make, for example here and here, about who we should be looking to when facilitating legal tax avoidance becomes the central defining characteristic of a tax regime created by the interaction of multiple jurisdictions.

Thanks, New York Times, for inadvertently covering international tax policy in a fun story with pictures and even a graphic.

Friday, January 31, 2014

Shachar & Baubock on Citizenship for Sale

Ayelet Shachar, who previously published The Birthright Lottery, a book about how citizenship is an inheritance that can make or break individuals' life chances, has edited a compilation of twelve short essays on the question of whether citizenship should be a commodity, together with Rainer Baubock. Here is the abstract:
On 12 November 2013 the Maltese Parliament decided to offer Maltese and European citizenship at the price of € 650,000, but implementation of the law has been postponed due to strong domestic and international critiques. On 23 December, the Maltese government announced significant amendments, including a higher total amount of € 1,150,000, part of which has to be invested in real estate and government bonds. Several other European states have adopted ‘golden passport’ programmes. Should citizenship be for sale? In November 2013 EUDO CITIZENSHIP invited Ayelet Shachar of the University of Toronto Law School to open a debate on these controversial policies. Twelve authors have contributed short commentaries, most of which refer to the initial law adopted by the Maltese Parliament. An executive summary by Rainer Bauböck provides an overview over the main questions raised in our forum. For further information on investor citizenship programmes see Jelena Dzankic’s EUDO CITIZENSHIP working paper on the topic and consult the news section of our observatory.
The issue of taxation is peripheral at best in most of these contributions. Yet for those interested in fundamental questions about belonging that are as yet unanswered in the tax policy literature, and specifically how FATCA and other automatic information exchange developments increase the possibility of citizenship-based taxation like never before, understanding whether and why citizenship should be a tie that binds a person to a state is fast becoming a critical issue.

Tuesday, January 28, 2014

Citizenship-Based Taxation and Taxpayer Rights Don't Mix

In this brief analysis, Taxpayer Rights, On and Offshore: the 2013 Taxpayer Advocate's Report to Congress, I looked at the problem created when an under-resourced tax agency is charged with implementing an over-expansive tax jurisdiction. Abstract:
In the 2013 National Taxpayer Advocate's Report to Congress, two concerns take center stage: the need for greater protection of taxpayer rights, and the increasing pressure on the system created by the U.S. tax regime’s extraterritorial reach. Neither of these issues is new; indeed, the NTA has repeatedly attempted to raise awareness of each over several years. But the Report demonstrates that these two concerns are on a collision course, and impact looks imminent for 2014 as the US doubles down on long under-enforced jurisdictional claims over nonresidents with US nationality or legal status. The basic impracticality of finding and claiming nonresidents with US ties is compounded by the violation of internationally recognized tax jurisdiction norms, creating an unsustainable enforcement rift that directly challenges the voluntarism theme that Olsen views as key to the fiscal system as a whole.
Further in, I argued that the NTA Report illustrates that taxing people on the basis of their nationality or legal status rather than their actual residence poses a serious problem for tax administration and violates international norms.

As a practical matter, globally rounding people up based on one government's ideas about their legal status is quite obviously unenforceable without assistance from other governments. This assistance fundamentally conflicts with a universally recognized (and far more just) jurisdictional claim based on actual residence. It is one thing for the US to say to individuals: if you have status under our law you must follow all of our laws no matter where you are. It is another to say to other countries--and much less individuals in other countries--if people who live in your country have US status as we define it, you are harboring potential criminals and you must help us find them and enforce our claim over them even if your government also claims them and even if our claim conflicts with your government's own law.

Thus status-based taxation is no less a poaching of other countries’ internationally recognized jurisdictional claims over taxpayers than the kind of poaching FATCA was ostensibly designed to attack (namely, that of the US tax base by other countries via bank secrecy). The basic unenforceability of status-based taxation coupled with its poaching of other jurisdictional claims would make it a total non-starter were nations to get together and discuss a multilateral adoption of status-based taxation as a policy everyone could get behind.

 But FATCA is a big stick that is bypassing any such conversation, going straight to the technical problem of compliance and enforcement under the banner of stopping tax evasion. There might be no remedy in international law for tax jurisdictional overreach but that only confirms that it must be challenged from both within and without the nation engaging in the bad behavior.

Thursday, January 16, 2014

Ireland: Oasis for American multinationals, desert for Irish workers

From last Sunday's NY times, opinion write Fintan O'Toole discusses life in Ireland, after it first gorged on a panoply of tax reforms meant to lure in multinationals, and then starved under austerity under financial crisis. Of note:
...Ireland has two economies: a global one dominated by American high-tech companies, and a domestic one in which most Irish workers have to make their living. The first is indeed booming. Not least because of those low corporate taxes, large global corporations find Dublin convivial for reasons other than its pubs and night life. The sheer scale of Ireland’s dependence on this kind of investment for its exports can be judged by the fact that Irish gross domestic product took a serious hit in 2013 when Viagra (which is made by Pfizer in County Cork) went off patent in Europe. Broadly speaking, however, the global side of the Irish economy has remained robust. 
But home is where the heartache is: in the domestic economy outside the gated community of high-tech multinationals. Outside Dublin, property prices are still falling. Wages for most workers have dropped sharply. Unemployment remains very high at 12.8 percent — and that figure would be higher if not for emigration. There’s always been a simple way to measure how well Ireland is doing: Go to the ports and airports after the Christmas vacation and count the young people waving goodbye to their parents as they head off to the United States, Canada, Australia or Britain, where they have gone to find work and opportunity. 
...[People in Ireland] are not convinced that the cruel scale of the punishment was necessary or that the nasty medicine has, in fact, worked. 
Behind both of these propositions looms the great contradiction in the supposed success story of Irish austerity. It was austerity only for citizens. Running parallel to all the cuts in public spending and all the calls for fiscal responsibility has been a program of spending so lavish that it makes a drunken sailor look stingy. 
The converse proposition is that when it comes to contributing to the mechanisms of the state--rule of law, infrastructure, educated workforce, etc etc, which fully support those multinational gated communities--the state looks primarily to workers to do the bulk of the heavy lifting, in the form of personal income taxes (41% at the top) and consumption taxes (23% on most goods). But Ireland is not alone in this political decision.

The story of feasts for corporations, famine for workers is a familiar one, and the trade off is supposed to be the positive externalities corporations bring. In other words, the political tradeoff that politicians think they are making goes as follows: we can give up our tax on corporate income if that lures more corporations into our jurisdictions which then hire our workers, whom we can then tax on their incomes and then again on their consumption, to pay for luring in more corporations, in a virtuous cycle. O'Toole's column strongly suggests that the externalities are not anywhere near what was expected or would be needed to continue the virtuous cycle.

The problem for the state is that the owners of corporate capital have received their benefit up front, but when they do not produce their side of the equation in exchange, there is no way for government to demand a refund.

Thus we can add Ireland's story to the multiple examples that exist in various iterations of it around the world, including for example the constant intra- and inter-state fights to lure in manufacturers, filmmakers, and sports teams. Maybe governments should be thinking about adding a carve-back clause to the fiscal bargain that creates oases for bargain-seeking multinationals, which would disgorge untaxed profits when it is clear a party to a tax incentive-fueled deal is not bringing what they said they would or could.

Thursday, October 17, 2013

Global Tax Expert Database?

I've been slowly working through a couple of manuscript reviews and in one of them I started thinking about the problem of fly-in expert consultation, i.e., the traditional model of tax experts from rich countries flying in to developing countries to assess the situation and provide advice for tax reforms. This was connected to a conversation I had on twitter last week about how to get needed research on technical tax policy alternatives accomplished, when donors and tax policy institutions like the OECD tend to focus on tax assistance that furthers rather than challenges the status quo. The dangers inherent in these paradigms include policy ossification helped along by ideological entrenchment, as well as the privileging of historical ideas about who ought to be considered an expert. Also relatedly, in a paper I am working on about tax governance and the problem of special interest group influence, I am thinking about how to create more policy space for alternative tax policy views from academics and non-governmental, non-industry groups--i.e., those without direct (pecuniary or otherwise) stakes in tax policy outcomes.

This brought me to thinking again that lending expertise upon demand (rather than pushing expertise onto others) is an appealing idea and I would like to see some sort of a matching program, through which interested academics, NGOs, and other non-industry, non-government experts could make themselves available to revenue officials, especially in poorer countries, to collaborate on reforms desired by the officials, for instance by reading reforms proposed by industry or legislators or commenting on drafts of proposed tax guidance and the like. It would be an interesting project in and of itself, mapping out and connecting areas of interest and expertise that are currently excluded from the established network of government-run tax policy institutions and otherwise fragmented by geography, resources, and institutions.

Coincidentally, after I recently posted a comment on twitter about how the US could take unilateral measures to curb global tax avoidance if it chose to do so, fellow twitterer @hselftax wrote, "the #AdoptanMP campaign aims to give tech tax info to UK MPs. Perhaps you need #AdoptASenator in US?" Fascinating idea! Here is a website that talks about it.

How might such a program be built transnationally and tailored to tax collaboration on request? It would need to be voluntary on both sides--i.e., folks who self identify areas they would be willing to consult on, together with disclosure of credentials and affiliations, and revenue officials who identify areas in which they are seeking outside expertise. Does such a platform already exist, i..e, on LinkedIn or elsewhere? Is there an app for this? I know that the OECD has created tax inspectors without borders, but what I have in mind is a slightly different model than official-to-official consultation.

Monday, August 19, 2013

Here is the only reason why Ted Cruz's citizenship is interesting.

It is not whether he's natural born and therefore eligible for the presidency. It is that Ted Cruz has suggested that he did not even realize he might be a Canadian citizen until the Dallas Morning News suggested it to him and asked a few experts on Canadian citizenship law to confirm that Canada, like the US, like many, many countries, confers birthright citizenship on people born in the territory whether they request it, or want it, or not.

This is interesting because this is all happening during America's ongoing roundup of every person on the planet who may be a US citizen because they were born in the US or by birthright through their lineage, for the purpose of imposing draconian penalties for failure to file tax returns and asset information reports under the US citizenship-based tax regime. This is the only tax regime in the world that treats lineage alone as a justification to impose worldwide taxation. Ted Cruz's expressed thoughtlessness about his own dual citizenship, coupled with his breezy intention to simply get rid of the unwanted extra citizenship, beautifully illustrates the major problem with citizenship-based taxation and why no other country on the planet would try to enforce such a system.

The US is right now imposing enormous penalties and unleashing general chaos on people living in other countries with US citizenship, both by newly enforcing long-ignored rules and by layering on top of these rules a new and more draconian layer of enforcement. The chaos comes in the form of fear-inducing, devilishly complicated and duplicative paperwork, and penalties, most of all penalties, and it is being piled on to millions of people around the world, many of whom, like Cruz, are very possibly only beginning to understanding that citizenship status is mostly conferred upon rather than chosen by individuals.

Ted Cruz should consider himself very lucky, because the citizenship he claims he didn't realize he had doesn't carry any punishment for his failure to recognize it. Moreover renouncing, if he really intends to follow through on that promise, will be relatively simple, cheap, and painless other than the cost to his US political career, if any.

Not so if he had lived his life in Canada with his current apparent dual status. US citizens abroad now understand that discovering ties to the US means discovering a world of obligations and consequences flowing from citizenship that you were expected to know and obey. Ignorance of the law being no excuse, the punishments range from the merely ridiculous--many times any tax that would have ever been due--to the infuriating: life savings wiped out and many future tax savings sponsored by your home government, such as in education or health savings plans, treated as offshore trusts and therefore confiscated by the US. Moreover there is no ready escape hatch for the newly discovered and unwanted US citizenship: five years of full tax reporting compliance must be documented, appointments must be made with officials, fees must be remitted, interviews must be conducted, and in some cases exit taxes must be paid. If some in Congress get their way, renunciation could even mean life-time banishment from the US someday soon.

In the grand scheme of things Ted Cruz's citizenship is a non-story. But for what it illustrates about citizenship-based taxation, it could be the story of the century.

Sunday, April 21, 2013

Are multinational companies a public good? If not, why are taxpayers subsidizing their global marketing strategies?

The story is that the Canadian government recently set up food trucks in Mexico in order to promote "Canadian cuisine," which the National Post pictures as follows:

Above: poutine. Below: tourtière, both from Quebec.
(the article says only QC has any sort of cultural food identity. Sorry BC!)
  
These national icons are being served from this truck:

Don't judge this book by its cover.
So, the Canadian government has gone to Mexico with a van decorated with fresh fruits...to sell gravy-and-cheese-slathered french fries and meat pie.

To be sure I'm not against either of these foods in principle (so long as the latter is served with maple syrup) and I'm not against Canadians...whether individual or corporate... setting up shop in Mexico to sell the hapless public yet more creative combinations of salt-sugar-fat. (Neither would I be opposed to Mexico imposing Pigouvian taxes on this activity, to compensate for the costly externalities visited upon the public health.)

But I very much object to taxpayers subsidizing the venture. I get that all countries try to promote their culture and in the process increase exports of their goods & services (or is it really the other way around). But as industrial policy goes, this has to be the bottom of the barrel.  If McCain Foods Inc cannot get the word out about its wonderful french fries, I simply cannot see how it becomes the  public's responsibility to provide it with free advertising. 

Last week we learned that corporate tax expenditures more or less equal corporate tax revenues raised in the US.  I haven't seen similar number crunching for Canada (working on it), but I expect for multinationals at least the story is very similar. If you then add these straight up subsidies, are we getting to a place where multinationals constitute a net drag on the fisc? If yes then we should be asking ourselves: when did we decide that multinational corporations are a public good that must be financially supported by other taxpayers? 

Is there anyone out there still clinging to the sense that a free market economy must mean something other than government subsidies for favored industries?

Add to summer reading list: Multinationals and Human Rights

John Ruggie has published Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights.  Abstract:

One of the most vexing human rights issues of our time has been how to protect the rights of individuals and communities worldwide in an age of globalization and multinational business. Indeed, from Indonesian sweatshops to oil-based violence in Nigeria, the challenges of regulating harmful corporate practices in some of the world's most difficult regions long seemed insurmountable. Human rights groups and businesses were locked in a stalemate, unable to find common ground. In 2005, the United Nations appointed John Gerard Ruggie to the modest task of clarifying the main issues. Six years later, he had accomplished much more than that. Ruggie had developed his now-famous "Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights," which provided a road map for ensuring responsible global corporate practices. The principles were unanimously endorsed by the UN and embraced and implemented by other international bodies, businesses, governments, workers' organizations, and human rights groups, keying a revolution in corporate social responsibility. 
Just Business tells the powerful story of how these landmark "Ruggie Rules" came to exist. Ruggie demonstrates how, to solve a seemingly unsolvable problem, he had to abandon many widespread and long-held understandings about the relationships between businesses, governments, rights, and law, and develop fresh ways of viewing the issues. He also takes us through the journey of assembling the right type of team, of witnessing the severity of the problem firsthand, and of pressing through the many obstacles such a daunting endeavor faced.
Excellent timing, with all the world watching whether and how governments are going to increase transparency with respect to MNCs and their local and global dealings.

Tuesday, April 2, 2013

To understand why citizenship-based taxation is objectionable, consider the STEM Jobs Act of 2012

Victoria Ferauge explains in as clear a way as may be possible why it is important to understand what people mean when they talk about citizenship-based taxation, and why the US effort to impose it with the big stick of FATCA is so objectionable to Americans living in other countries (also known as "immigrants" in those countries). She makes a number of points but I wanted to highlight one here:
In the [dialectic on Americans living abroad, which equates expatriation with tax evasion] it seems not to have occurred to the American public or its lawmakers that the people they are trying to attract [through immigration policies aimed at high-skilled workers] are the product of other countries' investments in producing a well-educated populace. 
In light of that, consider what the Heritage Foundation says about the STEM Jobs Act of 2012:
American businesses are struggling to fill high-skilled employment opportunities. STEM jobs grew at over three times the pace of non-STEM jobs between 2000 and 2010 and are expected to grow almost twice as fast by 2018. Business groups have spent years urging Congress to reform the visa system in order to fill these empty positions.
Enhancing the ability of high-skilled workers to enter the U.S. would be an asset to the nation’s economy as well as its indebted government. 
In case the instrumentalist nature of our interest in immigrants is not clear, the point is we're going to make these foreign-born, foreign-raised, foreign-educated, now high-skilled, highly-paid workers a permanent part of the American taxpaying public, which can increasingly be defined as the American wage-earning public. One may be forgiven, perhaps, for juxtaposing this deep thirst for foreign talent against America's ongoing disinvestment in its own social infrastructure, including public education (also helped along by the Heritage Foundation).

Victoria's post thus seems to me to contain the contours for constructing the normative case for taxing humans. There is much to be done on this topic, but it seems clear that the practice of admitting immigrants at all, let alone actively seeking highly-skilled ones, demonstrates that inbound human mobility is a social good that states support; that inbound human mobility (perhaps especially of the high-skilled kind) may be the product of rather intense social investment by some other country; and that conversely taxing on the basis of citizenship regardless of residence is a means of preventing outbound human mobility and so runs strictly counter to the overall good of human mobility while also being hostile to the aims of other countries also seeking inbound labour.

The US has long objected to onerous fiscal controls on the capital it sends across borders, so it seems particularly difficult to understand the ongoing support for placing onerous fiscal controls on its outbound labour supply. Contextualize that observation within the story of the shift of taxation from capital to labour over the past 50 years, however, and a pragmatic explanation is easily ascertained. But pragmatism does not make the normative case. In fact, it violates the conventionally-understood major normative factors for assessing taxation--efficiency, administrability, and fairness--because it introduces an insurmountable amount of arbitrariness. This topic deserves much more thinking than has been allocated to it by tax policy observers, including myself.

There is much more at the link, please do go and read Victoria's whole post.

Tuesday, February 19, 2013

I do love these US Dept of State "Remarks to Global Business Conference"

I have no idea why these remarks ended up in a State Dept email distribution I got today, as they date back to a year ago, but they are fascinating anyway: a speech given by Thomas Nides, Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources, to something referred to only as "Global Business Conference." That's not very specific, but I think you'll agree the remarks tell us a lot about the audience and the speaker (and governance, and the revolving door between business and government, and the role of law and the rule of law, and the stories we tell ourselves about those things, and etc etc). Excerpts of note:
...as Deputy Secretary of State and as a recovering businessman myself, I am delighted to welcome so many of my friends from my past and present lives all in one room.  
...First, why do we, as diplomats, care about economics? The simple answer is that good diplomacy is good economics, and good economics is good for diplomacy.
A reminder: what's good for GM is good for America. 
America's global leadership and our economic strength at home are fundamentally a package deal, and we need to shore up both of them. We live in an era where the size of a country's economy is every bit as important to exercising global leadership as its size of its military.
Was that ever not the case? It takes big money to build a big army and supply it with big guns.
The reach of our corporations extend far beyond where even our most aggressive diplomats and development workers hope to go. And, closer to home, America's people are hungry for economic recovery. In a global economy, there's no such thing as a purely domestic recovery. That means the State Department, which manages our relationships around the world, is essential to exercising our economic influence, keeping America prosperous, and creating jobs here at home. 
Second, why did we invite you? Because we believe that building sustainable global growth and creating jobs at home is fundamentally a joint venture. The private sector innovates and allocates capital, and delivers remarkable products and services. And the government opens new markets and ensures the rules are fair. At a time when competition is fierce and jobs are still too far scarce, we in diplomacy and business have to bring our partnership to the next level. 
You innovate, we make things fair, everybody's happy, to a whole nother level indeed. So, who got invited, who is in the room? Why, it's "Business leaders from across American industry, from large companies to small ones ... as well as organizations working to promote American business and fair competition, including my old friend, Tom Donohue." Don't know who that is? Read Matt Stoller's take from several years ago, it's important. And with whom will these business leaders be networking in the halls between remarks lauding their innovation and sheer excellence in creating jobs in America? "Vice President Biden, Commerce Secretary Bryson, our Trade Ambassador Ron Kirk, and the heads of Ex-Im, TDA, and OPIC and Secretary Clinton." And yet there's more, so much more to come.
Which brings me to my third question: What do we, as the State Department, bring to the table? I would submit that the answer is: a huge amount. We are the face of the United States in over 190 countries and at 274 posts around the world. We fight for your rights.
I know you want to add "to party" and I think overall, you'd be right to add it there.
...Over the past 60 years, we have helped establish the rules and institutions to safeguard healthy economic competition and spur unprecedented global growth.
Yikes. Just, yikes. But then there is this absolute gem:
...We have over 1,000 State Department economic officers around the world who wake up each day and ask themselves how they can help American companies large and small compete, connect, and win. From bilateral trade and investment treaties to open skies agreements, we open markets for your companies. We advocate on behalf of U.S. companies exporting to just about every country in the world. We make it a priority to help American companies take part in the growth unfolding across the developing world.  
...And whenever we have seen barriers to open and free and fair and transparent competition, our embassies around the world push back. We push back against unfair barriers to investment. We push back to protect intellectual property, to protest discrimination against our companies, and to guarantee that all companies get a fair shake, whether the owners sit in corporate boardrooms or government ministries. When American businesses are not fairly treated, that's not just an economic issue; it's also a diplomatic issue. 
And let me be clear. We just don't seek a fair shake for American companies; we seek a fair shake for all companies. ... We know that when the competition is open and free and transparent and fair to all people, American companies have what it takes to compete. And we know the same values that help our companies will also help local entrepreneurs, foreign businesses, and ultimately everyone for one simple reason: They create economic growth that improves lives.
Yeah!  That's how winning is done!  Don't forget to visit your mother.  Really, I just had no idea that the State Department had a pep squad of 1,000 "economic officers" [what is that? ah, negotiators of fair competition, economics knowledge helpful but not required] all over the world who woke up every day asking themselves those questions and then answering them. That really is remarkable.
Fourth and finally, what do we hope to accomplish here together? We want to hear from you. We want to know your concerns, where you see opportunities, where you see gaps in our work. We also want you to know that you can turn to us for support. 
...We at the State Department want to help create the conditions that will empower American businesses to get out there and take the risks that will drive a recovery around the world. ... The idea that business, on the one hand, and government, on the other hand, can simply operate in parallel worlds just doesn't cut it. We have to work together. That's what this conference is all about, and that's why I'm glad you're here. Thank you very much. (Applause.)
Then he introduces Ron Kirk. I always do enjoy a speech like this, even if I am a year late to the party. Number of times he used the word fair: 11.  The word compete or competition: 8. The word help: 8. The word jobs: 6. The word business: 17. The word lobby: 0.