Monday, September 17, 2012

U.S., U.K. sign FATCA pact

The WSJ blog reports that the U.K. is the first country to agree to implement the  tax-reporting requirements under FATCA:

Treasury said it expects to sign agreements with other countries in the near future, noting the U.K. deal is based on a model agreement developed in consultation not just with London but the governments of France, Germany, Italy and Spain. 
“We are pleased that the United Kingdom, one of our closest allies, is the first jurisdiction to sign a bilateral agreement with us and we look forward to quickly concluding agreements based on this model with other jurisdictions,” said Mark Mazur, assistant Treasury secretary for tax policy, in a statement. 
...While the U.K. agreement is reciprocal, allowing for the sharing of information on U.K. residents held in U.S. financial institutions, other deals may not allow for such exchanges.
It's not clear what's in it for the other country if an agreement does not provide for reciprocity; indeed, at least a superficial reciprocity is in general fundamental in the whole history of international tax agreements and I would like to know on what grounds a nonreciprocal agreement would even be contemplated.  Why would another country agree to share info with the U.S., to benefit the U.S. alone?  This is hardly a model for global tax cooperation, OECD praise notwithstanding.  Also each time I see another article about agreements on FATCA, regardless of the substantive content or likely efficacy thereof, the silence between the U.S. and Canada on this issue looms larger.

Do tax cuts lead to economic growth? Again, No.

Following on the report on state tax incentives, here is another report, this time from the Congressional Research Service, on the topic of taxes and economic growth.  David Leonhardt reports that the CRS finds that "changes over the past 65 years in the top marginal tax rate and the top capital gains tax rate do not appear correlated with economic growth."  

Friday, September 14, 2012

How to go offshore and disappear for a mere $400k

Richard Murphy got an email advertising an investment opportunity in St Kitts & Nevis:
A US$400,000 investment in the new Park Hyatt St Kitts development entitles the buyer to:
  • An investment in shares of a globally recognized brand
  • Annual income estimated between 2%-5%
  • St Kitts Citizenship benefits (with passport)
  • Security with an international developer and globally recognized brand
  • Complimentary enrollment in the Hyatt Gold Passport Diamond Level, the highest tier of Hyatt's guest loyalty programme.
As one of the oldest of its kind in the world, the St Kitts & Nevis Citizenship by Investment Programme provides the following prime benefits:
  • Fast processing of passport within four months
  • visa-free travel to more than 130 countries including Schengen Zone
  • No tax on worldwide income
For more information please click here
Murphy responds:
So, buy your holiday apartment and get a passport thrown in for free with no worldwide taxation. Now why would that appeal to anyone? 
As an example of a secrecy jurisdiction literally putting itself and its regulation - right down to citizenship – up for sale this one takes some beating. At the same time it shows just how tax haven activity is designed to undermine the very notion of the state whilst exploiting the power of the states that tax haven abuse captures to do so. The paradox and hypocrisy is all too apparent. 
Have no doubt that when I and others suggest tax haven abuse is meant to challenge democracy, our way of life and the states that support it we mean it. Reducing the state and its processes to a commodity is part of the process of destroying it.

What is the middle class?

Apropos of thisJason Myers asks, " If I referred to the middle of my car as every part of it except for the front and rear bumpers, would I have something in mind other than obfuscation or misdirection?" 

Here is one picture of incomes in America, in case anyone has lost track:


from the Economic Populist, more at the link.

Wednesday, September 12, 2012

Do state tax incentives increase economic growth? No.

Taxprof points to this paper by Kenneth Meier and Soledad Artiz on whether state tax incentives actually deliver the economic growth their advocates consistently promise.  Their answer is no:
"Contrary to expectations, business taxation shows a significant positive relationship with the growth rate of GSP, implying that lowering business taxes may actually be harmful to the overall state economy. ... 
Rather than boosting the economy as expected, in reality these policies have been associated with a decrease in the growth rate of GSP and resultantly economic decline. Likely, although these policies bring in businesses, these businesses are not generating growth. This could also stem from the fact that a decrease in taxation limits the state’s ability to provide public services: a necessary component of a strong business climate. Overall, the most conservative interpretation of these results is that decreasing business taxes will not generate an increase in GSP."
Yet I don't expect massive changes in tax policy, because as the authors state, tax incentives = economic growth is a matter of faith:

The belief that tax rates affect business decisions, which in turn influence economic growth, is virtually universal among state politicians...
Although the theoretical support for a negative relationship between business taxation and economic development seems clear, few empirical studies have documented this relationship... 
Even though a negative relationship between business taxation and economic development is theoretically expected, empirically this relationship is still unknown.
There are thirty pages of appendix in the article, but somehow I doubt the data will alter the politics.


Moving McJobs-ward: more jobs but smaller paychecks, plus stagnation in pay equity

There's always plenty of talk about how many jobs have been saved or created but not nearly enough of what kind of jobs there are.  That's because quantity is relatively much easier to articulate than quantity and by articulate I mean "use for political purposes."  But today, NPR has this:

and this:

NPR says nothing about the gender pay gap, but isn't it amazing that since...oh, somewhere in the late 80s I guess (the graph inexplicably has no bottom axis but indicates it covers 1967-2011, but the tick marks don't seem to add up right), the two lines stop slowly coming together as they had been, and start moving up and down in sync, apparently perfectly preserving the inequality?

Also for the top chart, I note that of all male workers, 71% are currently in full time jobs now, versus 68% in 1967, while for female workers about 60% are currently full time, versus 43% in 1967.

NPR's  point is that "while high unemployment remains a big problem for the U.S. labor market, it's not the only problem. There's also a long-term stagnation in real earnings for people who have jobs."

Moreover one full time job with middle class wages, sick pay, vacation pay, health care benefits, and a pension plan is not equal to one part time job at minimum wage with no benefits of any kind.  And the trend is indeed McJobs-ward.  Yet the raw number is the primary message of the monthly obsession over job creation/savings.

Tuesday, September 11, 2012

McGill Tax Policy Colloquium

This fall marks the third instalment of the McGill University Faculty of Law Tax Policy Colloquium.  This year’s colloquium features a number of distinguished invited speakers who will contribute a rich variety of scholarly works in progress on topics of national and international tax law and policy issues.  If you will be in Montreal on any of these dates, I invite you to join the tax policy class to hear presentations by this illustrious group.  All presentations begin at 11:35 in New Chancellor Day Hall, Room 201, at the Faculty of Law, 3644 Rue Peel, Montreal, Quebec.

A GATAR when a GAAR just won't do

From TJN: The UK is considering a bill to introduce a general anti tax avoidance rule (GATAR) to defend against financial arrangements made with the primary purpose of avoiding tax.  The sponsor of the bill calls tax avoidance "the cancer of British society." The UK has a general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) already in place, but according to Richard Murphy, who wrote the text of the bill:
It (is) very obvious that they only want to stop the most abusive of tax schemes. There are probably at most a handful a year that will be stopped as a result and since they'll now probably never see the light of day because of the GAAR it is quite possibly true that the government's proposed law might be a massive white elephant in that it might never be used.
The difference between Murphy's proposal and the government's is, as Murphy explains:
Meacher's Bill is broader by design than the government's. It covers VAT and national insurance for a start, almost doubling the value of the taxes that it would cover compared to the government's Bill, which omits both these taxes. 
Secondly, instead of being extremely narrowly focussed, as the government's Bill is, Meacher's is designed to target abuse on a wide range of tax issues. So, for example, it attacks shifting income from one tax to another to reduce the tax paid and it challenges any scheme resulting in tax paid late. It also tackles any scheme that might artificially shift a profit subject to tax out of the UK. In addition if it seems that the wrong person is paying tax on a source of income or that the source of income in question is wrongly described e.g. as investment income when it actually seems to come from a profit or employment, then Meacher's Bill gives HM Revenue & Customs the power to challenge the arrangement.
...It gives the Revenue the right to look at what has really gone on in a transaction, and who really seems to be involved in it, and to then compare that economic reality with the way in which the transaction has been reported for tax (or has not been reported if someone has tried to shift it right out of the UK tax net).
TJN says the bill will most likely get shot down in parliament.  You can track its progress here.



It's déjà vu all over again: constructive receipt edition

Yet another effort by a Cap Gemini partner to undo his own effort to constructively receive income is struck down by another appeals court.  Four tries in four different courts, all unsuccessful.  This is an odd series of cases, but of interest because usually it is the IRS rather than the taxpayer trying to accelerate an income inclusion; here the taxpayers purposefully arranged things so as to accelerate the income, and then later decided that was a bad strategy, tax-wise.  But too late: the taxpayer is (and I think should be) stuck with the fruits of his own creativity.

William F. Hartman et ux. v. United States; No. 2011-5110

WILLIAM F. HARTMAN AND THERESE HARTMAN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in case no. 05-CV-675, Judge Margaret M. Sweeney.

Decided: September 10, 2012

KENNETH R. BOIARSKY, Kenneth R. Boiarsky, P.C., of El Prado, New Mexico, argued for plaintiff-appellant.
FRANCESCA U. TAMAMI, Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. With her on the brief were TAMARA W. ASHFORD, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, GILBERT S. ROTHENBERG, and KENNETH L. GREENE, Attorneys.

Before DYK, O'MALLEY, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.

DYK, Circuit Judge.

William F. Hartman and Therese Hartman (collectively, "the Hartmans") appeal a decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims ("Claims Court") granting summary judgment to the government on the Hartmans' claim for a federal income tax refund. Hartman v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 168 (2011). Because the Claims Court properly determined that the Hartmans were not entitled to a refund, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

This case requires an interpretation of the Treasury Regulations governing the constructive receipt of income, which in turn interprets section 451 of the Internal Revenue Code, imposing a tax on "[t]he amount of any item of gross income . . . for the taxable year in which received by the taxpayer."1 I.R.C. § 451(a). Under the Treasury Regulations, taxpayers computing their taxable income under the cash receipts and disbursements method must include as taxable income "all items which constitute gross income . . . for the taxable year in which actually or constructively received." Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(i). "Income . . . is constructively received by [a taxpayer] in the taxable year during which it is credited to his account, set apart for him, or otherwise made available so that he may draw upon it at any time, or so that he could have drawn upon it during the taxable year if notice of intention to withdraw had been given. However, income is not constructively received if the taxpayer's control of its receipt is subject to substantial limitations or restrictions." Id. § 1.451-2(a).
The question here is whether Mr. Hartman constructively received all shares of stock allocated to him for the sale of Ernst & Young LLP's ("E&Y") consulting business in 2000 (as originally reported) or whether he received only that portion of the shares which had been monetized (sold) in 2000 (as reflected in the Hartmans' amended return and request for a refund).2

I

The background of this dispute began in 1999. In late 1999, E&Y was preparing to sell its consulting business to Cap Gemini, S.A. ("Cap Gemini"), a French corporation. At this time, Mr. Hartman was an accredited consulting partner of E&Y. On February 28, 2000, E&Y and Cap Gemini devised a Master Agreement for the sale of E&Y's consulting business. Under the Master Agreement, E&Y would form a new entity, Cap Gemini Ernst & Young U.S. LLC ("CGE&Y"), and would then transfer E&Y's consulting business to CGE&Y in exchange for interest in CGE&Y. Each accredited consulting partner in E&Y, including Mr. Hartman, would then receive a proportionate interest in CGE&Y. Each partner would terminate his partnership in E&Y, retaining his interest in CGE&Y. The accredited consulting partners would then transfer all of their interests in CGE&Y to Cap Gemini. In exchange for their respective interests in CGE&Y, E&Y and the accredited consulting partners were to receive shares of Cap Gemini common stock. The shares of Cap Gemini common stock would be allocated to each accredited consulting partner in accordance with his proportionate interest in CGE&Y. Additionally, each accredited consulting partner was to sign an employment contract with CGE&Y, which would include a non-compete provision. CGE&Y would then become the entity through which Cap Gemini would conduct its consulting business in North America.
As a part of the transaction described in the Master Agreement, each accredited consulting partner was also required to execute and sign a Consulting Partner Transaction Agreement ("Partner Agreement") between the partners, E&Y, Cap Gemini, and CGE&Y. Under the Partner Agreement, the Cap Gemini shares received by each accredited consulting partner would be placed into separate Merrill Lynch restricted accounts in each individual partner's name. The Partner Agreement further provided that for a period of four years and 300 days following the closing of the transaction, the accredited consulting partners could not "directly or indirectly, sell, assign, transfer, pledge, grant any option with respect to or otherwise dispose of any interest" in the Cap Gemini common stock in their restricted accounts, except for a series of scheduled offerings as set forth in a separate Global Shareholders Agreement ("Shareholders Agreement"). J.A. B-627. The Shareholders Agreement provided for an initial sale of 25% of the shares held by each accredited consulting partner in order to satisfy each partner's tax liability in the year 2000 as a result of the transaction, and subsequent offerings of varying percentages at each anniversary following closing.3 Although their right to sell or otherwise dispose of Cap Gemini shares was restricted, the accredited consulting partners enjoyed dividend rights on the Cap Gemini shares beginning on January 1, 2000, without restriction. The dividends earned on the Cap Gemini shares were not subject to forfeiture. Additionally, the accredited consulting partners had voting rights on the Cap Gemini shares held in the restricted accounts, though they provided powers of attorney to the CEO of CGE&Y to vote the shares on their behalf.

In addition to the restrictions on the sale of the shares, certain percentages ("forfeiture percentages") of the Cap Gemini shares were subject to forfeiture "as liquidated damages." J.A. B-628. The percentage of shares subject to forfeiture declined over the life of the agreement and expired entirely at four years and 300 days following closing.4 In the period four years and 300 days following closing, the applicable forfeiture percentages of the shares would be forfeited if the accredited consulting partner (1) breached his employment contract with CGE&Y; (2) left CGE&Y voluntarily; or (3) was terminated for cause. Id. Additionally, where the accredited consulting partner was terminated for "poor performance," he would forfeit at least fifty percent of the applicable forfeiture percentage.5 Notwithstanding the monetization restrictions and forfeiture provisions, the Master Agreement provided that the parties, including the accredited consulting partners, "agree that for all US federal . . . Tax purposes the transactions undertaken pursuant to [the Master] Agreement will be treated and reported by them as . . . a sale of a portion of the [CGE&Y] interests by . . . the Accredited Partners to [Cap Gemini] in exchange for the Ordinary Shares [of Cap Gemini]."6 J.A. B-123-24. Cap Gemini was required to provide E&Y and each accredited consulting partner with a Form 1099-B with respect to its acquisition of the CGE&Y interests.7 The Master Agreement also provided that "the parties agree that all [Cap Gemini] Ordinary Shares that are not monetized in the Initial Offering will be valued for tax purposes at 95% of the otherwise-applicable market price." J.A. B-555.

II

In early March of 2000, E&Y held a meeting in Atlanta with all E&Y partners to discuss the details of the proposed transaction with Cap Gemini. Prior to the meeting, E&Y distributed a Partner Information Document, dated March 1, 2000, to its partners which summarized the Master Agreement and Partner Agreement, and purported to explain the tax consequences of the transaction as set forth in those agreements. The Partner Information Document provided that "[t]he sale of Consulting Services to Cap Gemini is a taxable capital gains transaction," and that the partners would be "responsible for paying [their] own taxes out of the proceeds allocated to [them]; however, [each would] receive funds from the sale of Cap Gemini shares for [their] tax obligations as they come due." J.A. B-726. The document further provided that "[t]he gain on the sale of the distributed [CGE&Y] shares is reportable on Schedule D of [each partner's] U.S. federal income tax return for 2000." J.A. B-727.
Mr. Hartman and the other E&Y accredited consulting partners signed the Partner Agreement prior to May 1, 2000, and the transaction closed on May 23, 2000. By signing the Partner Agreement, Mr. Hartman became a party to the Master Agreement and thereby "agree[d] not to take any position in any Tax Return contrary to the [Master Agreement] without the written consent of [Cap Gemini]." J.A. B-124. Mr. Hartman received 55,000 total shares of Cap Gemini common stock, which were deposited into his restricted account. Twenty-five percent of Mr. Hartman's Cap Gemini shares (necessary for payment of income taxes related to the transaction) were sold in May of 2000 for approximately 158 Euros per share, for a total monetization of $2,179,187 in U.S. dollars, which was deposited into Mr. Hartman's restricted account.

On February 26, 2001, Mr. Hartman received a Form 1099-B from Cap Gemini reflecting the consideration he was deemed to have received under the Master Agreement (a total value of $8,262,183), including a valuation of his unsold Cap Gemini shares at approximately $148 per share (reflecting 95% of the market value of the shares). On August 8, 2001, the Hartmans filed a joint federal income tax return for 2000, reporting the entire amount listed on the Form 1099-B (less cost or other basis) as capital gains income. Additionally, in filing its own 2000 federal tax return, Cap Gemini used the 95% valuation of the shares to determine the value of intangible assets to be amortized pursuant to I.R.C. § 197.8

III

Following closing of the transaction, the value of Cap Gemini shares dropped drastically, from approximately $155 per share at closing to $56 per share by October 2001. Mr. Hartman voluntarily terminated his employment with CGE&Y on December 31, 2001.9 Upon his departure, Mr. Hartman forfeited 10,560 shares of his Cap Gemini stock and received a credit for the taxes he paid on those shares in his 2000 tax return pursuant to I.R.C. § 1341, which provides for the computation of tax where a taxpayer restores amounts previously held under a claim of right. In December 2003, the Hartmans filed an amended federal tax return for 2000, claiming that they had received only the 25% of Cap Gemini shares that had been monetized in the year 2000, with the remainder being received in 2001 and 2002. They sought a refund of $1,298,134. The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") failed to act on the Hartmans' claim for a refund, and on June 21, 2005, the Hartmans filed suit in the Claims Court against the government seeking a refund of taxes paid for 2000.
The Claims Court found that the Hartmans had constructively received all 55,000 shares of Cap Gemini common stock in 2000, and that the Hartmans had properly reported the gain from the transaction on their income tax return for 2000 and thus were not entitled to a tax refund. Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment for the government, and the Hartmans timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). We review "the summary judgment of the Court of Federal Claims, as well as its interpretation and application of the governing law, de novo." Gump v. United States, 86 F.3d 1126, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

DISCUSSION

I

The Hartmans' claim for a refund of taxes paid based on the transaction at issue in this case is not unique. Three courts of appeals have already squarely addressed the issue presented before us with respect to other similarly situated former E&Y accredited consulting partners. Each circuit to consider the transaction at issue here has concluded that the taxpayers were not entitled to a refund of taxes paid in 2000. See United States v. Fort, 638 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Bergbauer, 602 F.3d 569 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Fletcher, 562 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2009).10 As it argued before the Claims Court and the Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, the government contends that the Hartmans are not entitled to a tax refund for two reasons.
First, the government argues that under the "Danielson Rule," the Hartmans may not disavow receipt of the Cap Gemini shares in 2000 after having agreed to be bound by the Master Agreement which required them to recognize the shares as received in 2000 for the purposes of their federal income tax returns. The "Danielson Rule" takes its name from Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967) (en banc), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 858 (1967), where the rule was described:

[A] party can challenge the tax consequences of his agreement as construed by the Commissioner [of Internal Revenue] only by adducing proof which in an action between the parties to the agreement would be admissible to alter that construction or to show its unenforceability because of mistake, undue influence, fraud, duress, etc.

Id. at 775. Our predecessor court expressly adopted the Danielson Rule, see Proulx v. United States, 594 F.2d 832, 839-42 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Dakan v. United States, 492 F.2d 1192, 1198-1200 (Ct. Cl. 1974), and we have consistently applied the rule in subsequent cases involving "stock repurchase agreements which contain express allocations of monetary consideration between stock and non-stock items," Lane Bryant, Inc. v. United States, 35 F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. v. United States, 974 F.2d 1319, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 1992).11
Here, the government seeks to extend the Danielson Rule to situations where the taxpayer agrees, not to the allocation of consideration, but to a particular tax treatment for the consideration, i.e., when the consideration is received by the taxpayer. Although the Claims Court recognized the Danielson Rule as "binding" in this circuit, it concluded that the rule is limited only to situations where "a taxpayer challenges express allocations of monetary consideration," rather than a situation where, as in this case, a taxpayer challenges how a transaction should be treated for tax purposes, and refused to apply the rule. Hartman, 99 Fed. Cl. at 181-82 (internal quotation mark omitted). In this appeal, it appeared that the parties differed as to whether the Hartmans were obligated under an agreement with Cap Gemini to report the shares of Cap Gemini stock as received in 2000, and we requested and received supplemental briefing on that issue.

Second, the government contends that, although the shares were not actually received in 2000, Mr. Hartman nonetheless constructively received the shares in accordance with Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2. In addressing this issue, the Claims Court noted that "while the shares were held in the restricted account, Mr. Hartman could vote them and receive dividends from them," and therefore, "Mr. Hartman received all of the shares, for tax purposes, in 2000, when they were issued to him by Cap Gemini." Hartman, 99 Fed. Cl. at 187. The court further reasoned that "[t]he control that Mr. Hartman exercised over his Cap Gemini stock in 2000 was not defeated by the monetization restrictions and forfeiture conditions described in the transaction documents," because "Mr. Hartman voluntarily agreed to accept his share of the transaction proceeds with these limitations." Id. at 185. Thus, the Claims Court concluded that the shares of Cap Gemini stock were constructively received by Mr. Hartman in 2000.

Because we agree that Mr. Hartman "constructively received" the Cap Gemini shares in 2000 under the Treasury Regulations, we need not reach the questions of whether the agreements did in fact require the Hartmans to report the shares as received in 2000, and if so, whether the Danielson Rule could apply to situations where parties agree to a particular tax treatment.

II

The constructive receipt issue turns on the interpretation of the constructive receipt regulation, Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2, and whether, under that regulation, Mr. Hartman constructively received all of his allocated shares of Cap Gemini stock in 2000.
We note initially that although the accredited consulting partners' right to "sell, assign, transfer, pledge, grant any option with respect to or otherwise dispose of any interest" in the Cap Gemini common stock was restricted, the Cap Gemini shares here were set aside for each accredited consulting partner in a Merrill Lynch account in each partner's name, and the partners were able to receive dividends from and vote the shares (though subject to a power of attorney) during the period of time in which the sale of the shares was restricted. The risk of a decline in the value of the shares and the benefits of any increase in the value of the shares accrued entirely to the accredited consulting partners. Under the agreement, the shares immediately vested in the partners to ensure that the shares would not be treated as deferred compensation for future services.12 Thus, the benefit of ownership of the Cap Gemini stock to each accredited consulting partner extended far beyond "the mere crediting [of the stock] on the books of the corporation."13

It appears that the Hartmans make three arguments with respect section 1.451-2 of the Treasury Regulations. First, relying on the "or otherwise made available so that he may draw upon it at any time" language in the regulation, the Hartmans contend that the Cap Gemini shares were not constructively received when placed into Mr. Hartman's restricted account because he could not access them under the provisions of the Partner Agreement. But, as the government points out, constructive receipt extends to many situations in which the taxpayer cannot immediately draw upon the account. The quintessential example of constructive receipt covers the situation in which a taxpayer cannot, by his own agreement, presently receive an asset. See Goldsmith v. United States, 586 F.2d 810, 815 (Ct. Cl. 1978) ("[U]nder the doctrine of constructive receipt a taxpayer may not deliberately turn his back upon income and thereby select the year for which he will report it.").

Second, the Hartmans argue alternatively that at the time that Mr. Hartman entered into the Partner Agreement, he was not presented with the alternative option of receiving the assets free of restriction. But as discussed below, the existence of an opportunity to receive the assets at the time of escrow creation, i.e., free of all restrictions, is not a necessary requirement for constructive receipt. There is constructive receipt if the taxpayer exercised substantial control over the escrow account. Finally, the Hartmans urge that even if they are wrong as to their first two arguments, the accredited consulting partners did not have sufficient control over the shares to constitute constructive receipt. Relying on section 1.451-2 of the Treasury Regulations and our interpretation of that regulation in Patton v. United States, 726 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1984), the Hartmans contend that Patton held that there is no constructive receipt where a third party controls the right to receive the shares (or certificates). This last argument warrants some discussion.

In Patton, a subchapter S corporation determined to make a $346,000 distribution to its shareholders.14 Because of its insolvency, the corporation was unable to make the distribution to the shareholders from its own funds and had to borrow the $346,000 to distribute to its shareholders. Id. at 1575-76. The corporation secured a loan from the bank and then purchased three certificates of deposit in the names of its shareholders (two for $115,000 and one for $116,000). Id. at 1576. The IRS claimed that the certificates represented dividend income to the shareholders in 1974, the tax year of the purchase of the certificates of deposit. The taxpayers claimed that the dividends would not be received until the certificates matured (upon the corporation's repayment of the $346,000 loan to the bank). The two $115,000 certificates were pledged as collateral for the loan, and thus "were never set aside for the individual benefit of the shareholders, but remained in the custody and control of the bank as collateral," and could not "have [been] delivered . . . to the shareholders had they so demanded." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The third certificate was made payable to the shareholders such that they could pay their federal income taxes on the distributed income. Id. On its federal income tax return for the year in which the certificates were purchased, the corporation reported that all the income had been distributed, while the shareholders failed to report receipt of any of the certificates as taxable income. Id.

We held that, while the third certificate was income to the shareholders, the two pledged certificates of deposit were not "constructively received" by the shareholders, reasoning:


Although the [shareholders] may have become the owners of the [pledged] certificates of deposit when the bank issued the certificates . . . in the name of the [shareholders] . . . , at that time the certificates were not "unqualifiedly made subject to their demands" and the [shareholders] did not constructively receive them. . . . The [shareholders] did not constructively receive the certificates because, except for the receipt of the interest from the certificates, the [shareholders] could not have obtained or directed the distribution of the certificates.

Id. at 1577. We further noted that "it was far from certain that the [shareholders] ever would obtain the certificates, since the corporation's financial condition might result in its default on the loan and the bank's consequent foreclosure of the pledge of the certificates," id., and "[t]he control and authority of the bank over the certificates of deposit . . . constituted 'substantial limitations or restrictions' upon the appellants' control over receipt of the certificates," id. at 1578.
The Hartmans contend that, as in Patton, Mr. Hartman did not constructively receive the shares of Cap Gemini stock in 2000 (except for those shares that were monetized) because his receipt of the shares was subject to "substantial limitations or restrictions," i.e., the distribution of the shares was within the control of a third party.

However, the Hartmans' reliance on Patton is misplaced. Two significant features distinguish this case from Patton. First the restrictions were imposed by the taxpayer's own agreement and not by an agreement between the distributing corporation and a third party (the bank in Patton). Unlike Patton, Mr. Hartman and the other accredited consulting partners agreed to condition receipt of their shares on satisfaction of their own contractual obligations under the Partner Agreement and their employment contracts with CGE&Y. Under such circumstances, Mr. Hartman cannot now be heard to complain that such restrictions undermine his constructive receipt of the shares. The Claims Court rightly found that "Mr. Hartman voluntarily agreed to accept his share of the transaction proceeds with these limitations." Hartman, 99 Fed. Cl. at 185. The fact that Mr. Hartman voluntarily agreed to subject himself to the restrictions imposed by the Partner Agreement cannot defeat constructive receipt. See Soreng v. Comm'r, 158 F.2d 340, 341 (7th Cir. 1947) ("We can discern no rational basis for a holding that the dividends received by the [taxpayers] are not includable in gross income merely because they or [sic] their own accord entered into a contract with a third party as to the manner of their disposition when received."). As the Fourth Circuit in Harris v. Commissioner, 477 F.2d 812, 817 (4th Cir. 1973), noted when interpreting section 1.451-2 of the Treasury Regulations, "[s]ale proceeds, or other income, are constructively received when available without restriction at the taxpayer's command; the fact that the taxpayer has arranged to have the sale proceeds paid to a third party and that the third party is, with taxpayer's agreement, not legally obligated to pay them to taxpayer until a later date, is immaterial."

Second, under the Partner Agreement, the conditions that could result in forfeiture were within the control of the accredited consulting partners themselves rather than within the control of Cap Gemini. In Patton, the shareholders had no control over their receipt of the certificates, and indeed may have never received them, due only to the corporation's failure to comply with its obligations to the bank, not due to any obligations of their own. Here, each partner had direct control over whether the shares would later be forfeitable. See Fort, 638 F.3d at 1341. The forfeited shares were characterized in the agreement as "liquidated damages," and were forfeitable only where partner breached his employment contract, left CGE&Y voluntarily, or was terminated for cause or poor performance, all circumstances over which the accredited consulting partners exercised control. See J.A. B-628.

Although the Hartmans contend that the determination of "poor performance" was within the control of Cap Gemini, the Hartmans have pointed to no evidence in the record to suggest that the "poor performance" clause could be utilized to terminate employees due to circumstances outside of the employees' control.15 As the Eleventh Circuit recently noted, "the plain meaning of being terminated for 'poor performance' is not being terminated for any reason at all. Rather, poor performance clearly refers to unsatisfactory performance. It would be a strained interpretation . . . to hold that 'poor performance' does not really mean poor performance, but actually means 'any reason at all.'" Fort, 638 F.3d at 1342.

Other circuits, even before the Cap Gemini controversy, have held that where restrictions on receipt are imposed in order to guarantee performance under a contract, the income is nonetheless received when set aside for the taxpayer. See Chaplin v. Comm'r, 136 F.2d 298, 301-02 (9th Cir. 1943); Bonham v. Comm'r, 89 F.2d 725, 727-28 (8th Cir. 1937).16

In Chaplin, Chaplin, an artist, received two certificates of stock (167 shares each) in United Artists Corporation ("United") in 1928; however the certificates were immediately placed in escrow until 1935. 136 F.2d at 299. Under the terms of an agreement between Chaplin and United, Chaplin was required to deliver five motion picture photoplays to United. Id. at 301. Upon delivery of each photoplay, one fifth of the shares held in escrow were to be released to Chaplin. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the United shares had been received by Chaplin when they were placed into escrow. Specifically, the court reasoned that "[o]ne nonetheless owns personal property because held by another to insure the performance of a contract." Id. at 302. Similarly, in Bonham, the Eighth Circuit held that where "stock was issued, the title passed then to [taxpayer], and the stock was retained as a pledge" to guarantee performance, the shares were taxable in the year that title passed to the taxpayer. 89 F.2d at 727.

The Hartmans contend that Chaplin and Bonham are inapplicable here because those cases were decided before the adoption of the constructive receipt regulation at issue here. See Republication of Regulations, 25 Fed. Reg. 11,402, 11,710 (Nov. 26, 1960) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). However, nothing in the regulatory history of section 1.451-2 indicates that the IRS intended to overrule the holdings of Chaplin and Bonham, and indeed, Chaplin and Bonham are consistent with the regulation. Notably, the IRS General Counsel Memorandum, issued after adoption of the constructive receipt regulation, cited Chaplin and Bonham with approval, noting that where "the taxpayer exercises a considerable degree of domination and control over the assets in escrow, the courts and the Service have generally held . . . that income is presently realized notwithstanding that the taxpayer lacks an absolute right to possess the escrowed assets." See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,073 (Mar. 31, 1977). The language of the regulation is consistent with those cases, providing that "income is not constructively received if the taxpayer's control of its receipt is subject to substantial limitations or restrictions," i.e. that the "control" over receipt lies with a third party and not with the taxpayer. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (emphasis added). In both Chaplin and Bonham, it was the taxpayer's conduct that determined whether he would receive the stock at issue, not a decision by a third party. The stock in Chaplin and Bonham was to be released to the taxpayer upon fulfillment of his contractual obligation, over which he exercised complete control. See Chaplin, 136 F.2d at 302; Bonham, 89 F.2d at 727-28.

We agree with the Seventh Circuit that here "[t]he sort of contingencies that could lead to forfeitures were within the expartners' control. That implies taxability in 2000, for control is a form of constructive possession." Fletcher, 562 F.3d at 845; see also Fort, 638 F.3d at 1342 ("[C]onstructive receipt was not impossible simply because [taxpayer] was required to forfeit the shares upon the occurrence of certain conditions, because [taxpayer] had sufficient control over whether those conditions would occur."). By agreeing to condition release of the shares on continued employment with the corporation (a contractual obligation, satisfaction of which only he controlled), Mr. Hartman exercised control over his receipt of the shares.

In summary, under Mr. Hartman's own agreement, the Cap Gemini shares were "set aside" for Mr. Hartman in a brokerage account. Mr. Hartman received dividends from and was entitled to vote the shares in the year 2000. Mr. Hartman exercised control over his receipt of the Cap Gemini shares under the forfeiture provisions of the Partner Agreement. In light of these attributes of dominion and control, we conclude that Mr. Hartman constructively received all 55,000 shares of Cap Gemini common stock in 2000 when they were placed into his restricted account to guarantee his performance under his contractual obligations.

The Claims Court's decision granting summary judgment to the government on the Hartmans' claim for a refund of federal income taxes paid in 2000 is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.


FOOTNOTES


1 See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011) ("The principles underlying our decision in Chevron apply with full force in the tax context. . . . Filling gaps in the Internal Revenue Code plainly requires the Treasury Department to make interpretive choices for statutory implementation at least as complex as the ones other agencies must make in administering their statutes. We see no reason why our review of tax regulations should not be guided by agency expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same extent as our review of other regulations." (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984))).
2 Although the transaction at issue in this case (the sale of E&Y's consulting business to Cap Gemini) involves only Mr. Hartman, both Mr. and Mrs. Hartman filed suit for a refund of taxes paid based on the transaction, as they filed a joint tax return in 2000.

3 The monetization schedule was later modified from annual scheduled offerings to "a more flexible approach that allows one or more transactions over the course of each year." J.A. B-682.

4 The applicable forfeiture percentages were 75% prior to the first anniversary of closing; 56.7% prior to the second anniversary of closing; 38.4% prior to the third anniversary of closing; 20% prior to the fourth anniversary of closing; and 10% prior to the fourth anniversary of closing plus 300 days. At four years and 300 days following closing, the Cap Gemini shares were no longer subject to forfeiture.

5 Where a partner was terminated for "poor performance," a review committee comprised of senior executives selected by CGE&Y would determine an appropriate amount of forfeiture between 50% and 100% of the applicable forfeiture percentage.

6 The Partner Agreement further provided that the accredited consulting partners "acknowledge [their] obligation to treat and report the Transaction for all relevant tax purposes in the manner provided in . . . the Master Agreement." J.A. B-624.

7 IRS Form 1099-B, Proceeds From Broker and Barter Exchange Transactions, is the tax form on which sales or redemptions of securities, futures transactions, commodities, and barter exchange transactions are reported.

8 Cap Gemini was later audited by the IRS, which conducted an examination of the transaction between Cap Gemini and E&Y, but did not make any adjustments to the tax treatment of the transaction.

9 Although Mr. Hartman ceased performing any duties for CGE&Y on December 31, 2001, he was permitted to remain an employee of CGE&Y through May 24, 2002 (following the second anniversary of closing) to allow him to reduce his applicable forfeiture percentage from 56.7% to 38.4%.

10 Several district courts have also reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Fort, No. 1:08-CV-3885, 2010 WL 2104671 (N.D. Ga. May 20, 2010), aff'd, 638 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Nackel, 686 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (C.D. Cal. 2009); United States v. Berry, No. 06N-CV-211, 2008 WL 4526178 (D.N.H. Oct. 2, 2008); United States v. Bergbauer, No. RDB-05R-2132, 2008 WL 3906784 (D. Md. Aug. 18, 2008), aff'd, 602 F.3d 569 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 297 (2010); United States v. Fletcher, No. 06 C 6056, 2008 WL 162758 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2008), aff'd, 562 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Culp, No. 3:05-cv-0522, 2006 WL 4061881 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 29, 2006).

11 For tax purposes, monetary consideration allocated to the purchase of stock is treated differently from monetary consideration allocated to the purchase of non-stock intangibles such as a covenant not to compete. While the amount allocated towards the purchase of stock is taxed as a capital gains transaction, "the amount a buyer pays a seller for [ ] a covenant [not to compete], entered into in connection with a sale of a business, is ordinary income to the covenantor and an amortizable item for the covenantee." Danielson, 378 F.2d at 775.

12 The Hartmans rely on cases where income was placed in escrow or in trust with the understanding that specified amounts would be released to the taxpayer for performance of future services. These cases hold that, where the taxpayer could not elect immediate receipt, the income was not constructively received when placed in escrow. See, e.g., Drysdale v. Comm'r, 277 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1960) (compensation paid by employer to trustee to be released to employee upon satisfaction of contractual employment obligations was not constructively received by employee until released). However, in the present case, the Hartmans (understandably) do not contend that the Cap Gemini shares held in the restricted accounts represent payment for Mr. Hartman's services in CGE&Y, since such an arrangement would result in taxation of the shares as ordinary income rather than as capital gains.

13 The constructive receipt regulation states that "if a corporation credits its employees with bonus stock, but the stock is not available to such employees until some future date, the mere crediting on the books of the corporation does not constitute receipt." Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a).

14 A "subchapter S corporation" is a small business corporation established under subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code, I.R.C. §§ 1361-1379, in which "each shareholder is taxed upon his or her share of the corporation's income." Patton, 726 F.2d at 1575.

15 Indeed, testimony presented before the Claims Court indicated that where employees were terminated due to a reduction in force (which was based on business necessity rather than performance), they did not forfeit any shares. See J.A. C-494-95.

16 See also Fort, 638 F.3d at 1339 (citing Chaplin and Bonham); Fletcher, 562 F.3d at 844 (same).

Business in India not taking ball, going home

When India pushed back on tax avoidance after the Vodafone case, lobbyists came out in full force opposition and people predicted investment would flee in the face of the tax reform, while I said that "if U.S. businesses really don't like what India is doing, they have a perfectly viable option, which is to do what they say they are going to do, namely, take their assets and go home.  But they do not want to do that."  This week in the Economist we get confirmation that business is not in fact fleeing India, tax & regulatory state notwithstanding:
At the start of 2012 India offered a cocktail that seemed guaranteed to be lethal for foreign investment: a faltering economy, corruption and political gridlock. In March came the final flourish, the equivalent of the barman spitting into your Death in the Afternoon. A budget was passed that aimed retroactively to tax Vodafone, the country's biggest foreign direct investor, and to clamp down on the holding structures used by most foreign investors, in particular the routing of money through the low-tax paradise of Mauritius.
In April alone, foreigners sold almost $1 billion of portfolio investments...Since April, however, portfolio investors have piled back in ... with net buying of some $5 billion of shares and bonds. This is surprising. There has been no clear improvement in India’s fortunes. Yes, there is a new finance minister and those tax rules have been delayed and diluted (although Vodafone’s fate is still unclear). But the political climate has soured further, lessening the chances of reforms or more prudent fiscal policy. 
The Economist concludes that it is the "resilience" of the firms, and not India's economy, that is responsible.  Maybe so, but it is at least as clear that a government that tries to prevent tax avoidance is not an obstacle to investment.  There is not much discussion of the diluted and delayed tax reform; the last I have seen suggests the matter is still on the table.
 

Monday, September 10, 2012

The ultimate gated community is just a free zone with a new name

MR cautions not to "equate charter cities with extraterritoriality": a charter city works either "because a dominant hegemon — perhaps at a distance — supports the external system of law" or because "the external system of law serves up some new and especially tasty rents to domestic interest groups."  Either way, the charter city is not sovereign, rather some established sovereign is exerting control.  So a charter city is really just a free zone: another experiment in relaxing regulation that Honduras has already tried (along with many many countries, yes, including the U.S.), this one just has a name that taps into some emotional sentiment having to do with freedom and choice and entrepreneurialism.  If Honduras just called this another free zone project, perhaps few would take notice or wonder about it.

As this is just a new name for an old idea, it should not be surprising how quickly we see the familiar accountability/transparency issues pile up.  MR points to the Guardian, which reports:
Plans to create a neo-liberal start-up city in Honduras with its own laws, tax rules and police force suffered a setback on Friday when the economic guru who inspired the project said he has been unable to act as its guarantor and watchdog. 
...days after the deal was announced, Romer said he had not been given the powers and information necessary to fulfil his role as chairman of the transparency commission, which is meant to ensure governance of the new development zones.
Romer said he and four other international figures were appointed by presidential decree to the commission, which has wide-ranging powers to appoint and fire governors, nominate judges and hire auditors in the proposed new zones. But the five will issue a statement distancing themselves from this week's announcement and calling into question the legality of their appointment, which they say has not been published in the official gazette as required by Honduran law, ostensibly because of a challenge in the constitutional court.
Free zones have been around for a long time, they have been studied extensively, and they don't have a great track record, most especially when they lack major up front governance policy planning.  Calling the project a charter city won't avoid these difficult problems.

As an aside, I notice that the Guardian puts a price tag on the deal: a business consortium called NKG is paying $14 million for its city.  Who is NKG?  Not the Northern Kite Group or the Neumann Kaffee Group, I suspect.
 
 

One fraudulent voter, and 3 things as likely to occur as that

a 3-mile-wide meteorite hitting the earth.   finding an orange lobster.  And one vote actually impacting the outcome of an election.  These three things have about the same percentage chance of happening as a person fraudulently voting in Florida.

This is because among the 10 million voters on Florida's rolls, a months-long search for a virtual tidal wave of fraudulent voters by Republican leaders in the state has turned up but one: a Canadian citizen who pretended to have U.S. citizenship so he could own a gun and vote.  Perhaps not in that order.  The Globe and Mail has the story here.  The man pled guilty and faces a sentence of up to five years and deportation back to Canada; most of the remaining 179,999 persons identified as potentially fraudulent voters were cleared:
Under pressure from the [Florida] governor, the state’s electoral officials had initially flagged more than 180,000 names (many of them Hispanic-sounding) for checking. All but 2,600 of those initially flagged – some of whom turned out to be not only citizens, but military veterans with service in Afghanistan and Iraq – were quickly determined to be bonafide citizens and restored to the voter rolls. 
After further investigation, only one name – Mr. Sever’s – was sent to law-enforcement authorities last spring. Six other “suspect” cases, in a state with more than 10 million names on the voters’ list, are still being investigated.
All that effort to catch one in ten million: curbing voter fraud is a costly lottery.  From Slate:

Here’s the paradox of the new voter ID crackdown, of the 38 states that have debated or passed legislation that puts more demands on voters. The new laws—and in Florida, new executive campaigns—ask voters to show driver’s licenses at the polls, or prove their eligibility with birth certificates, or prove that they’ve never had a felony, or prove that they are citizens of the United States.
Doing that involves navigating your state’s bureaucracies. Those bureaucracies have been shrunk or frozen by years of belt-tightening. They rely on data from other cost-cutting organs of the state. Imagine giving some endomorphic amateur athlete a low-calorie diet and limited access to a gym. He’s training for a mile-long fun run, so there’s no pressure. All of a sudden, you panic about the threat of Sprinting Fraud or something, and you inform the runner of his new task: Run a timed 3.5-mile circuit, tomorrow.
The calorie restriction imagery is apt.  Starve-the-beast led to the strangling of administrators; now those same administrators are meant to spend what little resources they have left to chase after a problem that statistically doesn't even exist, in the meantime cutting off some 2.2 million eligible voters.  A strategy in which the taxpayers, the administrators, and democracy lose should not be a winning strategy.  Yet as we well know, non-voting by certain constituencies will help certain politicians claim victory.

Thursday, September 6, 2012

The Ultimate Gated Community

Disappointing that AP saw no need to report on what it costs to buy your own private city.  It couldn't be nothing ... could it?  I would like to see the memorandum.  Does it read like a contract?  Like a treaty?

Wednesday, August 29, 2012

What Americans Do All Day

They commute, work, and sleep, mostly.  48 minutes to groom, 34 minutes to care for others, 6 minutes to learn something.  Oh, for a country by country comparison.  From NPR:




FATCA & Multilateralism

I have suggested before that FATCA seems to me to be a bargaining chip to get other countries to negotiate on tax info exchange with the US.  The OECD seems to support this objective:
 The OECD welcomed today a new model international tax agreement designed to improve cross-border tax compliance and boost transparency.

Developed by the United States, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, the model allows the implementation of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) through automatic exchange between governments, reduces compliance costs for financial institutions and provides for reciprocity.   
...OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría said:  “I warmly welcome the co-operative and multilateral approach on which the model agreement is based. We at the OECD have always stressed the need to combat offshore tax evasion while keeping compliance costs as low as possible. A proliferation of different systems is in nobody’s interest. We are happy to redouble our efforts in this area, working closely with interested countries and stakeholders to design global solutions to global problems to the benefit of governments and business around the world.” 

As a next step, the OECD will organise, in cooperation with the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD, a briefing session on the “Model Intergovernmental Agreement on Improving Tax Compliance and Implementing FATCA” at OECD headquarters in Paris in September 2012. The Organisation will then quickly advance to design common systems to reduce costs and increase benefits for governments and businesses alike. 
A major irony in the model agreement is that it's not at all clear to me that the US can furnish what it requires to be furnished by other countries, from the get go:

The information to be obtained and exchanged is:
(a) In the case of [FATCA Partner], with respect to each U.S. Reportable Account of each Reporting [FATCA Partner] Financial Institution: 
(i) the name, address, and U.S. TIN of each Specified U.S. Person that is an Account Holder of such account and, in the case of a Non-U.S. Entity that, after application of the due diligence procedures set forth in Annex I, is identified as having one or more Controlling Persons that is a Specified U.S. Person, the name, address, and U.S. TIN (if any) of such entity and each such Specified U.S. Person;...

This will be hard for the US to do in the face of anonymous incorporation, nor do I understand how a multilateral agreement can work if it cannot ensure reciprocity.  Nevertheless, it now begins to come clear that FATCA looks like a unilateral attempt to accomplish that which is not being  accomplished multilaterally through the usual (OECD) channels, namely, automatic info exchange with the US.  Steven Dean disagrees, though, and says the multilateralism envisioned here won't lead to more information being shared.  I hope he will weigh in and give his insights on this.

Meanwhile, one of FATCA's architects recently defended it in "A Report from the Front Lines."  Using imagery like "the front lines" gives the general idea about the tone: this is war.  He takes on the sovereignty issue as follows:
[T]he United States also has the sovereign right to protect its tax base by implementing a FATCA regime, and that if a Swiss FI does not want to be part of the regime, it is free to either avoid the U.S. financial system or incur a 30 percent withholding tax. Said differently, if tax haven and bank secrecy jurisdictions want to build their banking system to cater to tax evaders, the United States and other countries should not be prevented from taking counteractions.
He concludes with this on multilateralism:
Nevertheless, the United States needs to continue aggressively pursuing FATCA, especially in the multilateral context. Obtaining significant progress toward a multilateral FATCA regime could provide many benefits:
  • reducing discrimination against U.S. citizens living abroad; 
  • providing relatively standard customer due diligence procedures; 
  • reducing the number of investment options available to U.S. persons attempting to hide money overseas; and 
  • eliminating the complex passthrough payment rules. 
...In summary, the U.S. government has made significant progress toward addressing the use of offshore accounts to evade U.S. tax, but the war is not yet won. Much work still needs to be done. In addition to implementing FATCA in the United States, Treasury and the IRS should be pursuing an agreement among major countries as to the proper level of customer due diligence, and, ultimately, a multilateral FATCA regime involving several major countries. A multilateral approach will provide many benefits.
It is left to the reader to wonder, what benefits, and to whom?

Glaxo Tax Dodging: Belgium Edition

This article is in French but roughly translated it asks, how could Glaxo pay something like 3% in taxes on  2.3 billion euros in profit in Belgium?  And the answer is Belgian tax policy that allows earnings stripping to the tune of a 320 million euro tax break for the global pharma conglomerate.  TJN explains:
The main story is about how the GSK Group used Belgium as a tax haven to avoid tax on over a billion Euros in royalties linked to GSK's worldwide sales of the swine flu vaccine Pandemrix in 2009-2011. In a nutshell, these royalties were taxed at less than 3%, thanks to two Belgian fiscal measures: first, a 80% deduction on royalties earned by the company, and second, the so-called "notional interests", a Belgian tax specialty. 
More generally, these two "fiscal gifts" helped GSK (through its Belgian subsidiary GSK Biologicals) to deduct €2.6 billion from its profits before tax between 2008 and 2011, and thus legally avoid 892 million euro of taxes in Belgium on worldwide sales of vaccines (H1N1 + others)




Tuesday, August 28, 2012

Fixing Carried Interest Today

Conventional wisdom seems to hold that Congress  must act for there to be any reform of the taxation of "carried interest" (the type of fees earned by investment fund managers such as Mitt Romney).  But if the goal is to tax carried interest at the same rate as, say, salary earned by auto workers, Congress need not act at all.  Rather, the Treasury Department could accomplish this on its own today.

This somewhat surprising conclusion comes from the fact that the Code already authorizes the Treasury Department to prevent taxpayers from using partnerships to convert certain types of income that would have been taxed at the ordinary 35% rate into income taxed at the preferential 15% tax rate.  For somewhat technical reasons, carried interest requires a partnership to be used for tax purposes.  Thus, Treasury could simply issue a regulation disallowing the 15% rate for carried interest.  Voila!  Carried interest fixed.

(Technically, Treasury could not issue a final regulation in one day.  But it could issue proposed regulations combined with a temporary regulation effective immediately upon publication and good for three years pending finalization, so long as the regulation is not "significant" - which Treasury believes (subscription required) tax regulations rarely are.  Close enough for my book.)

This may not be a "perfect" solution for many, or even most, people. It seems everyone has a pet theory, myself included, about what (if anything) should be done about carried interest.  But given the seeming inability of Congress to accomplish anything over the past couple of years, why waste time with Congress seeking a perfect solution when Treasury could enact a perfectly good one all on its own?

Monday, August 27, 2012

OECD on information

Here are two new OECD reports of interest: one on automatic information exchange (they are sort of for it) and the other on confidentiality of tax info (they are really for it).

Saturday, August 25, 2012

Collecting Taxes from Alter Egos: A Pyrrhic Victory for the IRS?

The government can usually only collect taxes from the person who owes them.  This makes sense - nobody wants the IRS showing up with a bill for someone else's taxes.  But there are exceptions to this rule - one of the most powerful being the "alter ego" doctrine. In short, the alter ego doctrine permits the IRS to seize the property of a shareholder for taxes owed by a corporation. This may surprise a lot of people.  After all, isn't the whole point of a corporation to provide limited liability to shareholders?  Can the IRS just ignore limited liability?

Unfortunately, the answer isn't entirely clear.  This is due, at least in part, to a conflict between two fundamental principles of tax law: first, that a validly formed corporation under state law is respected as a separate taxpayer from its shareholders and, second, that pure shams, even if they are valid for state law purposes, are disregarded for federal tax purposes. Owners of corporations, supported by most Courts of Appeals, tend to assert that state corporate law applies under the first principle, while the IRS claims that federal law applies and permits collection under the second.  This disagreement has recently bubbled into a controversy (subscription required).

A Fifth Circuit case from 2000 seemed to foreshadow the rise of this controversy (full disclosure: I clerked for Judge Dennis during the term this case was decided).  In that case, the Fifth Circuit held that the IRS needed some evidentiary basis to claim that a corporation was an alter ego before levying its property, rejecting the argument of the IRS that it could rely on subsequently discovered facts to justify its actions.  A separate concurrence went even further, concluding that the Fourth Amendment applied, meaning that the IRS had to meet the even higher "probable cause" standard of alter-ego status before imposing the levy.

It seems odd that the IRS can disregard state law, but that seems pretty well established (at least in certain contexts).  But I do think the IRS should be careful what it wishes for.  If a corporation exists as a separate entity from its shareholders under state law, even if it is an alter-ego for federal purposes, it is difficult to see why the Fourth Amendment would not apply to protect its shareholders.  In such case, the IRS would need probable cause that the corporation is an alter ego of the shareholder before starting any collection procedures against the shareholder.  But if the corporation didn't even exist for state law purposes, this would not be an issue and the IRS could collect against the shareholder.  So could insisting that federal law apply to alter-egos prove a pyrrhic victory for the IRS?

Friday, August 24, 2012

Is Transfer Pricing the Real Problem?

While Lee Sheppard provides a typically thoughtful and provocative analysis of transfer pricing, debating transfer pricing versus formulary apportionment feels much like rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic.  The real problem with international tax lies not in which technical rules should apply, but with a more fundamental question of how to divide the international tax base.

The original idea behind transfer pricing was to mitigate multiple countries taxing the same income - the so-called "double tax" problem.  What is often forgotten is that transfer pricing has done a pretty good job at mitigating double tax.  Unfortunately, it did so at the cost of creating double non-taxation, or income falling through the cracks.  Absent international agreement, there is no way to reduce one without increasing the other.  In other words, fixing double non-tax could just bring back double tax.  That may well be better than what we have, but it is definitely not free.

I agree with Sheppard that there are numerous problems with transfer pricing. I also agree that a shift to formulary apportionment would recapture much of the tax base lost to transfer pricing.  This has to be true.  For example, if tax base is allocated to the country of consumption, high consumption countries will benefit.  But there is little reason to believe low consumption countries would go along.

So how to get countries with disparate interests to agree on anything when it comes to division of tax base, especially when some countries can't even agree on signing a tax treaty with each other?  Thinking outside the tax treaty could well provide some answers.  This is not necessarily mutually exclusive with a move to formulary apportionment, but it may be necessary to fulfill its promise.