Friday, August 7, 2015

Update on the Canadian FATCA Litigation

As readers may be aware, two Canadian citizens filed a lawsuit last year against the Attorney General and the Minister of National Revenue in the Federal Court of Canada (Federal Court File T-1736-14). Over the past two days in Vancouver, the parties have presented their arguments in a summary trial in front of the Hon. Luc Martineau. The summary trial involves arguments on the parties' affidavits and cross-examinations undertaken prior to the hearings--no live witnesses.

In broad strokes the suit seeks to prevent the Canadian Revenue Agency from furnishing to the US Internal Revenue Service the personal and financial account information of Canadian citizens pursuant to the FATCA IGA signed by Canada and enacted into law last year. This is not a charter-based (constitutional) challenge, rather it is a challenge that certain provisions of the IGA are unlawful based on the Canada-US Tax Treaty Act  (which in effect ratifies the US Canada Tax Treaty) and the Income Tax Act. Thus it is not about fundamental rights and freedoms at this stage, but about an interpretation of relevant laws, including the existing tax treaty.

The litigants are being funded by a grassroots group that organized itself for this purpose, called the Alliance for the Defence of Canadian Sovereignty/L'Alliance Pour la Défense de la Souveraineté Canadienne (ADCS). ADCS has many of the court filings available here and here and here, and one of the group's organizers has blogged about the proceedings here and here.  While the lawsuit made the news when it was filed, e.g. here and here among several others, I am seeing virtually no press coverage at this stage, except for one brief article here. That is a shame and I hope that journalists will renew their interest in this issue.

Long-time readers will be aware that I made a submission to the Department of Finance concerning many of the legal issues surrounding the adoption of the IGA, that I understand FATCA to be a tax treaty override that is not cured by the IGAs, and that I understand the IGAs to lack validity as legal instruments under US law. In connection with this litigation, I wrote two "expert reports" and was cross examined for purposes of the summary trial; the reports and transcript are part of the court record and mostly available at the links above, but I will also make the reports available on request. If and when additional information about the summary trial becomes available I will update this post.



Tuesday, August 4, 2015

In global tax governance, institutions matter.

José Antonio Ocampo posted a plea for institutional reform in tax policymaking today,  in which he decries the jealous guarding of tax policy exclusivity by OECD countries, especially the US and the UK. At the recent Financing for Development conference, developing countries called for a greater role for the UN in global tax governance but the OECD countries balked. Ocampo writes:
The OECD, whose members are essentially the world’s 34 richest countries, certainly has the capacity to set international standards on taxation. Yet the domination of a select group of countries over tax norms has meant that, in reality, the global governance architecture for taxation has not kept pace with globalization. 
The Monterrey Consensus reached in 2002 included a call to enhance “the voice and participation of developing countries in international economic decision-making and norms-setting.” But although the OECD invites some developing countries to participate in its discussions to establish norms, it offers them no decision-making power. The OECD is thus a weak surrogate for a globally representative intergovernmental forum.
I understand that it is costly and complicated to develop institutions that allow for meaningful participation by all people affected by transnational tax policy norms.  But the international tax system is a resource allocation machine that has significant impacts on people's life chances across all populations. I fail to see what principles of justice support a world in which a small and privileged group of people make decisions of both process and substance that directly impact, and yet purposefully and systemically exclude, the majority of the world's population. The substance of norms, rules, and standards may matter in global tax governance, but ultimately institutions matter even more.

Wednesday, June 17, 2015

Uber deemed an employer, not a partner, to driver in California

So says the California Labor Commission according to this story from Reuters, and I would guess other jurisdictions will follow. But Uber responds that:
"Reuters' original headline was not accurate. The California Labor Commission's ruling is non-binding and applies to a single driver. Indeed it is contrary to a previous ruling by the same commission, which concluded in 2012 that the driver 'performed services as an independent contractor, and not as a bona fide employee.' Five other states have also come to the same conclusion. It's important to remember that the number one reason drivers choose to use Uber is because they have complete flexibility and control. The majority of them can and do choose to earn their living from multiple sources, including other ride sharing companies."
I would guess it is precisely the definition of "complete flexibility and control" that will be at issue going forward. I think Uber is an employer of its drivers for tax law purposes and that its drivers do not have anything like complete flexibility or control in substance.

Thursday, May 28, 2015

Updated: Gotcha! Yet another obscure asset reporting form for US persons

UPDATE: as of sometime this afternoon (depending on your time zone), the BEA has updated its website to extend the filing deadline to June 30 for all new filers. Moreover, it appears that the BEA definition of US Persons is generally limited to persons resident in the United States (with specific exceptions, see comment from Andrew below). As I mention in the comments, I am a bit wary about drawing conclusions of law from instructions to forms but I do think that the instructions at least form the basis for reliance that most physically non-resident US citizens should not be required to fill out the BE-10.  The sudden deadline extension nevertheless suggests that a number of people have been caught by surprise by the new reporting obligation, so that my main point about educating one's regulatory target is still apposite. I have revised this post accordingly.

It seems that in the United States, the asset reporting forms and non-filing penalties just keep on coming, and yet the will to inform individuals about their obligations--especially those who live outside of the United States and do not receive client alerts from big US law firms or big 4 accounting firms--remains curiously absent.  The Bureau of Economic Analysis does a survey of "US Direct Investment Abroad" every five years. In past years, if you were required to file, the BEA contacted you.

Not any more; now you are just supposed to know that the BEA exists and has its own reporting requirements, and that if you are a US person (which includes individuals), you are supposed to go and file a report to them, separate and distinct from all of of your other tax and financial asset reporting requirements. I do not know what the definition of US Person is for BEA purposes, and whether it includes US citizens and other persons, regardless of their residence--looking into that now. The definition of US Person for BEA purposes appears to diverge from that for tax purposes, such that in most cases reporting is required by those physically resident in the United States.

BEA reporting is subject to a civil penalty of $2,500 to $25,000 for nonfiling, plus $10,000, or a year in jail, or both, if the nonfiling was wilful. I am not sure who is responsible for collecting this fine but if it is the IRS (as is the case for FBAR), then I wonder why the Service doesn't bother to tell taxpayers about the form and its deadline anywhere at all on the IRS website.

A BE-10 form must be filed by any US Person that directly or indirectly held 10% or more of the voting securities ("US Reporter") of any non-U.S. business enterprise (a “Foreign Affiliate”). There are no de minimis exceptions: no matter how small your nonUS corporation might be (or have been-you must file for the year even if the corporation ceases to exist), you must report or face the penalty. US Reporters must file Form BE-10A for themselves and may have to file additional BE-10 forms for their corporations.

The deadline is tomorrow: May 29 now June 30. There is an extension available but it requires filing a request prior to the due date. Prepare for a delay in accessing that form right now--the BEA server appears to be overloaded. Possibly a request to extend filed today (if that is even possible from outside the United States) would be granted, I am not sure.

The BEA is a valuable source of information necessary for policy research, and I do not in any way object to the general need to collect information on US companies. What I object to is that again and again, US regulators seems to forget that "US Persons" includes a massive population of individuals who live permanently outside of the territory, who cannot realistically be expected to simply "know" about all the forms they are supposed to report, and who are dramatically underserved by the US agencies that continue to produce these requirements. US Persons are now potentially subject to three overlapping and duplicative reporting regimes, each with its own quirky forms, convoluted instructions, inconsistent deadlines, and heavy penalties: the IRS, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, and now, every five years, the BEA, all with little to no effort to educate the population each agency expects to be fully compliant.

I do wish that US lawmakers would understand that when they enact complex regulatory regimes with hefty penalties, they have a responsibility to educate the targets of that regulation. I am not talking about large, multinational conglomerates or high net worth individuals with teams of legal counsel. They are protected: their counsel's job is to keep up to date on all regulatory compliance regimes, inform their clientele, and and make money off compliance fees. I am not worried about them. I am talking about the human beings who just happen to live and work in other countries. If they have small businesses, they may well have non-US corporations in those countries where they live and work.  Regulatory agencies that seek to regulate these individuals have a responsibility to inform that is global in scope. It seems to me obviously unjust to suddenly impose complex requirements, with attendant penalties, on a whole new population without making any effort to educate them that this is the new order of things. Today's last-minute deadline extension seems to acknowledge this basic issue.

Wednesday, May 27, 2015

Presumption against Extraterritoriality: Win for foreign insurers in Validus Reinsurance case

Tim Todd had an article in Forbes yesterday on the Court of Appeals grant of summary judgment in Validus Reinsurance Ltd. v. United States, decided May 26. This was a de novo review; the district court had granted summary judgment for Validus in 2014 (Mem. Op. Feb 5, 2014), and the government appealed on grounds that the district court had "adopted an overly narrow interpretation." From the Court of Appeals decision:
Because both parties offer plausible interpretations, we conclude that the text of the
statute is ambiguous with respect to its application to wholly foreign retrocessions [a type of insurance product at issue in the case]. The ambiguity is resolved upon applying the presumption against extraterritoriality because there is no clear indication by Congress that it intended the excise tax to apply to premiums on wholly foreign retrocessions. Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment, albeit on narrower grounds, on Validus’s refund claims. 
Tim explains the jargon in the case so I won't repeat that here, but his point of note is that:
Generally, courts presume that legislation operates only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Thus, unless Congress expresses an “affirmative intention,” statutes have no extraterritorial effect. 
Here, the retrocessions were extraterritorial: wholly foreign parties issued policies that were “negotiated, executed, and performed outside of the United States.” And, the court noted, the “government has identified no clear indication by Congress that it intended the excise tax to apply to wholly foreign retrocessions, and we have found none.”
This is an interesting area of law that I have not studied enough but would like to. I note that the Appeals Court observed that "At first glance, the plain text of section 4371 appears to extend the reach of the IRS Commissioner to any casualty and life insurance policy issued by a foreign insurer anywhere in the world," but that read in conjunction with its definitions clauses, the scope is more modest. The court engages in a step by step statutory analysis (always fun) and ends up engaging in a fairly detailed discussion of what it means to "cover" something. Having hauled out a few dictionaries, the Court decides that the language is ambiguous, hence the need to turn to the general presumption against extra-territoriality.

In the context of a globally networked financial system, it is sometimes hard to tell the difference between something that is territorial and something that is extra-territorial in scope and reach. Here, the government had argued that the necessary nexus to the United States lay in the the underlying risks ultimately being insured--that is, "indirect" risk coverage. It seems that was one bridge too far for the DC Circuit.










Tuesday, April 28, 2015

Fei, Hines, Horwitz on PILOTs as Property Taxes for Nonprofits

Interesting new paper on PILOTs: "payments in lieu of taxes" that some municipalities request of otherwise tax-exempt orgs. At a recent talk I did at Notre Dame on the topic of taxation and human rights, I explored the dual "social contribution" budgets that highly visible/profitable multinationals often have in impoverished places--the tax budget (that ends up appearing quite small in many cases) and the Corporate Social Responsibility or "CSR" budget (the fees some companies pay to build infrastructure or schools or provide basic services as a matter of "good corporate citizenship"). I brought up Starbucks' dealings with HMRC in response to charges of tax dodging as a rarely-seen tax-like-but-not-quite-tax arising in a developed country, and wondered aloud whether we ought to consider this kind of CSR outlay as in the nature of a tax, or not. One of the audience members suggested that the Starbucks payment or a CSR budget seems analogous to PILOTs, so it's worth taking a look at them. Good idea. I'll add this paper to the reading list. Here's the abstract:
Nonprofit charitable organizations are exempt from most taxes, including local property taxes, but U.S. cities and towns increasingly request that nonprofits make payments in lieu of taxes (known as PILOTs). Strictly speaking, PILOTs are voluntary, though nonprofits may feel pressure to make them, particularly in high-tax communities. Evidence from Massachusetts indicates that PILOT rates, measured as ratios of PILOTs to the value of local tax-exempt property, are higher in towns with higher property tax rates: a one percent higher property tax rate is associated with a 0.2 percent higher PILOT rate. PILOTs appear to discourage nonprofit activity: a one percent higher PILOT rate is associated with 0.8 percent reduced real property ownership by local nonprofits, 0.2 percent reduced total assets, and 0.2 percent lower revenues of local nonprofits. These patterns are consistent with voluntary PILOTs acting in a manner similar to low-rate, compulsory real estate taxes.

Monday, April 13, 2015

Upcoming event on Delivering Tax Benefits through the Tax System

On April 24, the American Tax Policy Institute is live-streaming an all-day conference "Delivering Benefits to Low-Income Taxpayers through the Tax System."  The conference is organized by Les Book, Villanova University School of Law and Deena Ackerman, U.S. Department of Treasury.  

You can view the program and also register to attend the conference in person here.  


Beginning at 8:45 a.m. (EST) on April 24, you can view the livestream conference webcast

I will be presenting on panel 4, "The International Approach to Delivering Benefits Through the Tax System." 

One focus of this panel is a comparative approach to the delivery of benefits (US/UK/Australia), but I plan to focus on the international implications of the US approach to delivering benefits through the tax code from the perspective of a specific group of “end users” whose financial situations would make them eligible for benefits delivery but who are nevertheless systematically denied these benefits. 

This group is the globally dispersed population of “US persons” who are deemed to be permanently resident in the United States for tax compliance and financial reporting purposes but are not so deemed for purposes of benefits delivered through the tax code, notably, the earned income tax credit. 

The premise I am studying: The inclusion of all US persons in the tax base regardless of domicile, juxtaposed with the blanket denial of eligibility for income support based solely on domicile, reveals the manifest injustice of citizenship-based taxation. I'll examine three inter-related rights-based claims in support of this premise. First, dispersed geographically and without a unified voice in Congress, the diaspora is inevitably denied effective civil and political rights in the design of the US tax system. Second, subject to the most complex aspects of the U.S. tax code regardless of any activity in the United States, and facing extraordinary compliance costs and disclosure risks even for nil returns, this group is effectively denied the administrative rights articulated in the taxpayer bill of rights. Finally, this group is systematically denied income support accorded to similarly situated taxpayers, in contravention of any normative policy. 

These are ideas in progress, so I really look forward to having the opportunity to work through them a little further by participating in this event.




Thursday, April 2, 2015

Kadet on Transfer pricing vs Formulary Apportionment: How About the Profit Split Method?

Jeff Kadet has a new article at Tax Analysts [gated] entitled Expansion of the Profit-Split Method: The Wave of the Future, in which he discusses the so-called transactional profit split method of transfer pricing, which could be quite a lot more like formulary apportionment than it is like transfer pricing. Recall that the OECD really does not want countries to switch to formulary apportionment, even if that might end up being more effective at producing revenue at less administrative cost. But the profit split method might offer a way out, with a little tweaking. Here is the abstract:
Recognizing the reality that multinational corporations are centrally managed and not groups of entities that operate independently of one another, the OECD base erosion and profit-shifting project is considering expanded use of the profit-split method. This article provides background on why expanded use of the profit-split method is sorely needed. In particular, resource-constrained tax authorities in many countries are unable to administer or intelligently analyze and contest transfer pricing results presented by multinational groups. Most importantly, this article suggests a simplified profit-split approach using set concrete and objective allocation keys for commonly used business models that should be welcomed by multinational groups and tax authorities alike.
And here are a few excerpts:
December 2014 saw the OECD issuing several base erosion and profit-shifting discussion drafts, one of which was titled "BEPS Action 10: Discussion Draft on the Use of Profit Splits in the Context of Global Value Chains" .... 
Despite all the continuing rhetoric about how arm's-length pricing and the separate entity principle are sacrosanct, there are compelling reasons why the OECD BEPS project has focused on the possible expanded use of the profit-split method, a method that clearly flies in the face of these icons. ... 
[A] combination of factors has strongly motivated the highly successful tax structures that have significantly lowered the effective tax rates of multinational corporations (MNCs) and eroded the tax bases of many countries. The existence of these factors means that some of the transfer pricing methods are a part of the problem; they are not a part of a solution. These factors include ... [t]he Separate Entity Principle ... Fragmentation ... Respect of Related-Party Contracts ... The Arm's-Length Standard... the Inability to Effectively Audit MNC Transfer Pricing ... [and other issues].
...Paragraph 2.108 of the OECD transfer pricing guidelines gives a concise statement of what the profit-split method is. It states:

The transactional profit split method seeks to eliminate the effect on profits of special conditions made or imposed in a controlled transaction (or in controlled transactions that are appropriate to aggregate . . .) by determining the division of profits that independent enterprises would have expected to realize from engaging in the transaction or transactions. The transactional profit split method first identifies the profits to be split for the associated enterprises from the controlled transactions in which the associated enterprises are engaged (the "combined profits"). . . . It then splits those combined profits between the associated enterprises on an economically valid basis that approximates the division of profits that would have been anticipated and reflected in an agreement made at arm's length. 
Additional guidance in the existing guidelines (paragraphs 2.132ff) makes clear that the criteria or allocation keys on which the combined profits are split should be "independent of transfer pricing policy formulation." Hence, these criteria and allocation keys "should be based on objective data (e.g. sales to independent parties), not on data relating to the remuneration of controlled transactions (e.g. sales to associated enterprises)." Paragraph 2.135 makes this objective basis clear by stating: 
In practice, allocation keys based on assets/capital (operating assets, fixed assets, intangible assets, capital employed) or costs (relative spending and/or investment in key areas such as research and development, engineering, marketing) are often used. Other allocation keys based for instance on incremental sales, headcounts (number of individuals involved in the key functions that generate value to the transaction), time spent by a certain group of employees if there is a strong correlation between the time spent and the creation of the combined profits, number of servers, data storage, floor area of retail points, etc. may be appropriate depending on the facts and circumstances of the transactions. 
Further discussion in the guidelines provides various approaches to splitting the combined profits among the relevant group members. While these approaches are not detailed here, the point is that the approaches that were set out and discussed require a facts and circumstances case-by-case analysis before they can be implemented.
Kadet suggests that this facts & circumstances approach should be shelved in favour of developing a detailed set of objective allocation keys tailored specific types of business, and that for these businesses, the profit split method ought to be presumptive.  In other words, profit split is another word for apportionment; some types of businesses are so integrated that apportionment is the best way to allocate profits to the right jurisdiction; what is needed is a formulaic approach that tax administrations can administer. He notes:
The application of such rules should result in a reduction in complex BEPS-motivated structures since all combined profits will be spread among the group members that actually conduct activities with little or none left within low-taxed group members that do not conduct economic activity and thereby contribute little if anything to value creation. In sum, a simplified and standardized approach for each common business model will provide significant benefits as well as give results that are fair to MNCs and all relevant governments.
 He then goes on to provide a couple of examples taken from the DD10, one involving an internet service provider and the other featuring a manufacturer of R&D-intensive products. In the former, allocation keys include location of customers and workers; in the latter, they include location of customers and key workers (weighted at 25% each) and location of manufacturing operations (weighted at 50%). This is a fairly detailed discussion and well worth reading in full. I'll be interested to see how this idea develops.

Friday, March 6, 2015

Hockey and Tax

Hockey and taxes don't go together that often in the news (except in Australia, where they are one and the same right now), but it's hard to resist posting when they do:

NHL: 4 stories from Thursday night
It was another tough night for fans in Toronto, where the Leafs lost, (shocking I know), to the Lightning 4-2 with goals from four different Tampa Bay players and two assists from Steve Stamkos.   
The game can pretty much be summed up by the opening goal, where the Lightning's Nikita Kucherov was left so wide open, he had time to file his taxes before sniping a top-shelf goal past goalie Jonathan Bernier.
ouch. that's a lot of time. Sorry Leafs!

Thursday, March 5, 2015

Should Corporate Tax Returns be Public?

Last year, I participated in a symposium at NYU on the topic of tax and corporate social responsibility, on a panel with the above title. The NYU Journal of Law and Business has published the symposium issue, including a transcript of the discussions. You can view the entire symposium issue here,. Below I excerpt from my contribution but the entire exchange is worth a read.
... I think the story Josh is telling is that using transparency as a means to generate the political will for corporate tax reform poses some risk, real risk, to the tax system administration. I think we'll have some discussion about how genuine that risk is and how it should be measured against other risks, like firm competitiveness and proprietary information and so on. But I'll leave that discussion aside for now to focus on the first part of the proposition, and that is that what we're trying to do with corporate tax transparency is generate the political will for reform. 
Now I should preface this by saying that I am by nature and profession a curious type of person, and I would love nothing more than to be able to pore over the 57,000 pages of some corporation's tax return ... I think if you've read some of my prior work on the subject, you will no doubt be unsurprised to hear me say let's raise the curtain and have a look. Let's call it an issue of accountability and governance, and let's keep lawmakers on their toes by letting folks at this data that lawmakers are so jealously gardening for their own reasons. We humans don't seem to have too much privacy from the government, so let's us get to the business of crowdsourcing, the monitoring of the artificial people among us. 
But I keep coming back to the problem of what are we trying to solve here. If the goal is to generate political will for change, then I'm actually not so optimistic that corporate tax return disclosures is going to get us there. Instead I think it will lead us to continue having interesting discussions about whether or not we should be taxing corporations at all, or the variation that we had earlier today, which is how to draw the line between avoidance and evasion. 
That's to say we've already been taught, even without corporate tax disclosure, to expect that most American companies, especially those with a global footprint, aren't paying much tax anywhere. The jig is already up. This is not a secret. We're not rioting in the streets about it for the most part. Sure, corporate tax disclosure will confirm what we already know, but I'm not sure if getting all the gory details is going to push the political picture that much further. Maybe it will, because we clearly have an "Overton Window" in which really taxing American corporations is not thinkable. And maybe widespread naming and shaming, or just naming, will move that window. I think it's also possible that the sheer enormity of everything that you're going to see laid bare is going to very quickly lead to resignation and more handwringing, and not so quickly to actual reform. 
But if we're already at that stage now, we already have the stories - we already know the story. If we're already there, then we don't have to wait for corporate tax disclosure, do we? We can already accept the notion that if we're going to collect more from any taxpayer, corporate or not, what we need is not more public information, but more withholding and more third-party reporting. 
So let's see if I can unpack that a bit because I know that's to say a lot. I think it's worth noting that for the vast majority of people, it is not the case that the income tax system is voluntary. And why is that not the case? It is because for that vast majority, every dollar they earn is reported to the IRS by someone else. And most of these dollars are also subject to withholding, and so you have to work some to get any of it back at the end of the year. And if you are an employee, you won't get much opportunity in terms of base erosion at all; you're basically paying a gross receipts tax. We have made wage earners easy to tax with withholding and third-party reporting. And more or less, gross basis taxation with a few exceptions. 
But corporations are different. They are really hard to tax, especially when they are crossing borders. We give them lots of opportunities to carve away their gross and get to a very small net. Withholding and third-party reporting and filing for refunds is generally not the way we get corporations to pay tax. For them, as Reuven said earlier today, the income tax system really is voluntary, and lawmakers have given them a lot of discretion. Transfer pricing is just one very prominent example of this. 
... maybe disclosure is a way to have more informed public debate about the income tax system. But if we're having that discussion, then it seems not at all clear to me why we would be limiting the conversation to publicly traded corporations at all, when we are as or more interested in Cargill or SC Johnson or your local mom and pop cash flow all-cash business as we are in Google or Apple, who have at least to tell us a few stories about their tax affairs. 
And if we have that conversation, you must admit we are limiting ourselves to corporations ... and not looking at other untold billions of dollars that go untaxed because they're not subject to reporting or withholding. 
So now we come to the punch line, and that is that it is possible that corporate tax transparency is going to throw back the curtain on one sector of society - publicly traded corporations - but the irony is these are the people, this is the very sector about whom we actually have more information about tax than any other, precisely because they already have disclosure rules. That disclosure is exactly why we already know there's a problem, and yet we have not mustered the will to solve it. 
GE has been in the news with its zero corporate tax rate for years. ... I think little is likely to change with more info ... the conclusion, I think, we will be eventually forced to draw is that we, the public, haven't really mustered the political will for reform that would lead to more taxation of American companies. And we really can't help the IRS administer or enforce the tax system. In fact, as Josh suggests, we run the risk of undermining that effort, so disclosure might not get us very far at all. 
What we're going to have to do is start figuring out ways to do a lot more withholding and a lot more third-party reporting, and we are going to have to do that for all of our taxpayers, corporate or not, publicly traded or not. Maybe some or most of us already know that. We didn't need to read the corporate tax returns to tell us that, and we won't know anything new about the corporate tax system when we get that opportunity. 
Now I hate to end with the topic of FATCA. For those of you who don't know, FATCA is a global third-party reporting and preemptory withholding regime designed to make sure Americans declare and pay their taxes on income and assets held overseas. It is not a workable system, it's a mess, but think about the design. In theory, it says the IRS could eventually, once all the kinks are worked out and everybody gets onboard, track every dollar ever paid to any American anytime, anywhere. If that's true, if that's even partially possible, we can see the problem here is not at all about capacity. It is purely a question of political will and nothing more, and it never has been. 
A parade of stories about offshore tax evaders got the U.S. to adopt FATCA. Yet a parade of stories about GE, Google, and Apple avoiding their taxes has not got the U.S. to embrace corporate taxation. 
In fact, we seem to be seeing the opposite response in the base erosion and profit shifting initiative, but that's another story altogether. I'm not convinced, therefore, that corporate tax transparency will lead to more corporate tax. However, I would still love to get my hands on GE's tax return. Thank you.