Calls on the Commission to modify the existing rules without delay, in order to allow the amounts recovered following an infringement of EU tax-related State aid rules to be returned to the Member States which have suffered from an erosion of their tax bases, or to the EU budget, and not to the Member State which granted the illegal tax-related State aid, as is currently the case, as this rule provides an additional incentive for tax dodging;Even if the proposal goes nowhere, one can understand why the sentiment would arise. When I first started looking at the fiscal state aid investigations, this element struck me as counter-intuitive: where a state has foregone revenue in order to lure business in contravention of the antitrust rules in the TFEU, the punishment is then to collect the revenues foregone. The narrative thus is that the state successfully cheated its EU neighbours of an opportunity to attract foreign investment and the punishment is a cash windfall.
This looks more like a punishment if you think the collection of revenues by the state will cause the investment to flee to other jurisdictions because the targeted state is not competitive but for the state aid. That might not seem likely for Ireland, both because Ireland's general corporate tax rate is still lower than much of Europe even without the extra padding of the state aid, and because the successful luring of Apple arguably had its intended effect, creating spillover effects that gave Ireland a first-mover advantage which now extends its attractiveness beyond the favourable tax climate. In that case the MEP's position on the cash windfall is sympathetic.
Even if it is sympathetic, it is hard to imagine redistributing Apple's foregone tax revenue to other EU members, when it is at least debatable whether any of the recipients hold out clean hands. Tax competition is so ubiquitous, so multifaceted, every victim is a culprit, too.
In a potentially even more problematic move, the report "[c]alls on the Commission to consider the introduction of sanctions, either against the state or the company involved, for serious cases of illegal State aid". The array of issues involved in sorting out that kind of power structure is vast.
On a side note, the report contains a long list of tax harmonization goals, and it includes an interesting call for the EC to get in on the multilateral exchange of tax rulings, which, via the OECD BEPS initiative, are to be automatically shared among countries under conditions of confidentiality, including restrictions as to their use for non-tax purposes. The report "Emphasises that the Commission must, as a matter of course, have access to data exchanged between tax authorities which are relevant in the context of competition law." I am not sure whether sharing tax rulings with the EC would be compatible with the OECD confidentiality framework.
A very provocative report that signals a growing amount of frustration with ongoing tax competition, and an increasing desire of some to use the fiscal state aid rules to stop it. Will be interesting to see where this takes the field.